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ABSTRACT 
Hidden Agenda? Cultural Policy in 
Hong Kong’s Urban Redevelopment 
by 
ZUSER Tobias 
Master of Philosophy 
 For many years industrial buildings in Hong Kong have formed some of the city’s 
most vibrant cultural clusters by providing local artists with low-cost space to pursue 
their creative work. However, recent efforts by the government also targeted these 
areas for commercial revitalization. By 2020 the industrial part of Kwun Tong, a 
densely populated district in Kowloon East, will not only have been transformed into 
the city’s second Central Business District, but also seen the majority of the current 
cultural workers leaving due to the rapid valorisation of land. Nevertheless, these on-
going struggles over spatial power have also opened up a new space for a critical 
debate on Hong Kong’s urban planning and cultural policy strategies. This research 
uses the non-compliant Kwun Tong livehouse Hidden Agenda as a case study to shed 
light on the prospects for Hong Kong’s cultural diversity in its material, social and 
symbolic form of cultural clusters. By critically investigating research across different 
disciplines, I argue that—although the mere exposure of the contradictions between 
cultural planning and urban creativity discourses is significant—the governmental 
conditions that have been enabling the emergence of such spaces in the first place are 
often neglected by scholars and planners alike. Therefore, in order to understand both 
the destructive and productive impact of spatial power on Hong Kong’s cultural 
production, this thesis aims to examine the room for maneuvers within planning and 
policy discourses by expanding the Foucauldian approach of cultural policy studies to 
the domain of space.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“The first place was just dodgy. The sink was always 
leaking. When you washed your hands it dropped just right 
on the floor (…) and some friends actually slept next to the 
stage in bunk-beds, like in a dormitory. It looked really 
crappy. It was so small, we could only run shows for less 
than one hundred people. Basically, every time there 
happened some hilarious things, like sometimes the dog 
was running around and pooped on the stage, or the cat 
pissed on the audio panels.” 
   (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013)  
 
 
In early 2009 the livehouse Hidden Agenda staged its first concert in one of Hong 
Kong’s gritty industrial buildings—practically illegal, as it did not obtain any 
necessary permits.1 Five years later Hidden Agenda does still exist—illegally—and is 
regarded as one of the most infamous underground venues in the region. However, its 
ultimate expiry date has come closer, since the government has targeted the industrial 
areas in the city for a large-scale commercial overhaul. With the increasing economic 
pressure for such non-compliant spaces, the lack of cultural policy strategies within 
urban redevelopment projects has raised serious concerns about both the sustainability 
and diversity of locally produced culture. Or to put it bluntly: While space in Hong 
Kong is scarce, space for culture is even scarcer. Taking an interdisciplinary approach 
across cultural and urban studies, this qualitative research aims to analyze the 
discursive formation of cultural space that is entangled in contradictions of Hong 
                                                 
1 The term “livehouse” is a Japanese-English creation that is commonly used in the Asian-Pacific region and 
usually refers to a small or medium-sized venue for live music performances.   
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Kong’s cultural policy and urban planning.  
1.1 Background 
In 2013, when the newly appointed Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) held his anticipated first policy address, he used the 
term “space” for three different domains: housing, land supply and arts (Leung, 2013).2 
The latter was accompanied by the cultural vision to “give young artists and new arts 
groups more room for development” and by concrete plans such as the provision of 
creative space3 in an industrial building (Leung, 2013: 66). In fact, this can be deemed 
a historical event, since it was the very first time that the need for creative space was 
officially recognized as a policy concern in the annual address of any acting HKSAR 
Chief Executive.4  
However, the demand for arts spaces in the city has already taken a prominent 
stand in cultural policy debates as early as 1998, when more than 20 arts groups 
spontaneously occupied the Government Supply Depot in Oil Street, an abandoned 
building on Hong Kong Island that was reserved for commercial redevelopment 
(Cartier, 2008). After negotiations with the government about the necessity for cultural 
space the artists were offered a temporary lease, but had to leave the premises in 2000. 
Eventually, selected groups involved in the occupation were provided with an 
                                                 
2 The exact terms are “living space”, “underground space” (referring to structures that are built underground) and 
“creative space” / “arts space”.  
3 The terms “arts space”, creative space” and “cultural space” (as well as later “creative industries” and “cultural 
industries”) are used interchangeably in this thesis. Similar to what Lily Kong called “creative/cultural spaces” in 
“creative cultural clusters”, these terms refer primarily to physical indoor places where cultural forms—such as 
music, visual arts, literature, drama and dance—are produced or consumed. These can be private studios, 
rehearsal rooms or small venues.  
4 Compare Tung (1997-2005) and Tsang (2005-2011): http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/ 
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alternative studio at the Cattle Depot Artist Village on the Kowloon side, a former 
slaughterhouse and Grade II heritage site.5   
This establishment of Hong Kong’s first official arts cluster, which remained 
under the supervision of the government, also coincided with the emergence of a less 
visible arts scene. When Mainland China gradually opened up the market to foreign 
investment under the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, a lot of factories moved from Hong 
Kong to Guangdong Province, where the production costs were significantly cheaper. 
The arrival of the Asian financial crisis further diminished the amount of local 
manufacturers, so that by the late 1990s only 20% of all former factories were still 
operating in Hong Kong (Mak, 2012). Soon more and more people, among them many 
artists, became aware of the abandoned industrial areas with their suddenly affordable 
leases and decided to rent or buy their own spaces, with Fo Tan (New Territories), 
Kwun Tong (Kowloon) and Chai Wan (Hong Kong Island) being the most popular 
districts for these endeavors (Cartier, 2008). However, according to Hong Kong’s 
stringent town planning ordinance, the permitted use of space within industrial 
buildings is defined by the zoning plans. In the meantime many industrial areas have 
been rezoned by the Town Planning Board to more business-friendly categories, but 
the legal establishment of entertainment places, restaurants, shops, art studios and 
apartments is still restricted. Nevertheless, authorities have usually turned a blind eye 
on non-compliant users as long as they kept a low-profile. As a result these peripheral 
clusters have been literally out of sight from Hong Kong’s cultural display and 
                                                 
5 In Hong Kong, Grade I refers to the highest (“outstanding merit”), Grade II to medium (“special merit”) and 
Grade III (“some merit”) to the lowest heritage rating. Recently, the suitability of graded heritage sites for 
creative use has been questioned by artists and media, as any alterations (e.g. painting walls, removing interior) 
are highly restricted.  
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symbolic economy and also been barred from gentrification, with the positive side 
effect that rental costs in these areas remained significantly low.  
Meanwhile, with the global dissemination of creative industry and creative city 
discourses, cultural policy debates in Hong Kong started revolving around the West 
Kowloon Cultural District, a yet-to-be-realized 40 hectares cultural quarter with 
theatres and museums, as well as selected heritage sites and their transformation into 
creative hubs.6 But given Hong Kong’s unparalleled scarcity of land, these top-down 
projects have not only raised concerns over the allocation of public funding, but have 
also been accompanied by divergent views on the best possible use of space. Since 
further land reclamation in Victoria Harbour is prohibitied by law7 and therefore the 
opportunity for new real estate projects in prime locations kept to a minimum, the 
potential of industrial areas to overcome the shortage of office space in the city soon 
received attention from the government.   
In total, there are around 1,435 industrial buildings in Hong Kong that form a 
legacy from the 1970s when the city was one of the biggest consumer goods producers 
in the world, especially for toys, textiles and electronics. Most of these buildings are 
multi-storey flatted factories with fragmented ownerships that have made a smooth 
transactions of properties rather difficult.8 Therefore, in April 2010, the government 
introduced measurements to encourage the revitalization 9  of under-utilized 10 
                                                 
6 e.g. Central Police Station, Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre, Police Married Quarters, Comix Home Base 
(Mallory/Burrows Street), Cattle Depot Artist Village (see Ch. 4).  
7 The “Protection of the Harbour Ordinance” from 1999 prohibits further reclamation projects by recognizing the 
harbor as a “special public asset” and “natural heritage” of the Hong Kong people that needs to be preserved and 
protected (Cap. 531, 3).  
8 According to the EKEO (Interview, 2013), in extreme cases the ownership of one premise can be scattered 
among 300 to 400 people.  
9 Chinese: 活化 
10 Chinese: 使用率偏低 
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industrial buildings by offering favourable conditions for acquisition, conversion and 
redevelopment of such premises.11 This led to a significant valorization of industrial 
properties that increased both rent and sales prices. According to an investment 
company, no other asset class in Hong Kong has been appreciating so significantly for 
the last five years (SCMP, 2012). While at first sight the policy appeared to support 
community renewal, it especially assisted large developers to acquire property 
interests more easily (Mak, 2012).  
These measurements also had a major impact on creative spaces located in 
industrial areas. Responding to increasing concerns from the community, the Arts 
Development Council (ADC), a statutory body mainly responsible for the allocation 
of public grants, conducted a survey in 2010 on the “status of industrial buildings for 
arts activities and future demand”. Among other findings, the report showed that the 
majority of artists that rented studios in industrial buildings (about 65%) were of 
relatively young age (between 20 and 39) and practiced either music or visual arts 
(each around 37%). In its conclusion the ADC confirmed that these spaces have been 
adversely affected by the revitalization measurements and offered policy 
recommendations to the government (ADC, 2010). Since then, grassroots 
organizations such as the Factory Artists Concern Group12, R.I.P.13 and Hong Kong 
Culture Monitor14 have organized independent campaigns to raise awareness for these 
issues in local media and social networks.  
                                                 
11 For the exact wording of the measurements, see: http://www.devb.gov.hk/industrialbuildings/eng/policy_ 
initiatives/policy_measures_to_encourage_redevelopment_in_non_industrial_zones/index.html 
12 Chinese: 工廈藝術家關注組 
13 Abbreviation for Revitalisation Internalize Partnership (sic!), Chinese: 自然活化合作社 
14 Chinese: 香港文化監察 
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Eventually, the previously mentioned 2013 policy address both acknowledged the 
necessity for creative space and made a direct reference to the conversion of an 
industrial building in Wong Chuk Hang, an area in the Southern part of Hong Kong 
Island that has become a new popular base for art galleries that rate adequate exhibition 
space over a costly and spatially limited presence in the CBD (SCMP, 2013). Hong 
Kong’s rise within the global arts auction market, the internationalization of the annual 
art fair and the pervasive branding campaign of the future flagship museum “M+” 
inside the WKCD also created new platforms and occasions to engage with local visual 
art, much of which being in fact produced in industrial buildings. In the case of Fo Tan, 
the annual open-studio days (Fotanian) have played a significant role for both the 
recognition and accessibility of this industrial area as a dynamic arts cluster. In January 
2013, more than 30 000 people visited the event, a fivefold increase of visitors when 
compared to 2007. Currently, there are around 100 studios in Fo Tan with more than 
400 visual artists that form an “unlikely arts cluster in an unlikely city” (Kong, 2012). 
In 2012, Fotanian received a grant of HK$ 2 million out of the newly established Arts 
Capacity Development Funding Scheme from the Home Affairs Bureau (HAB).  
However, the dominant focus on visual arts has also marginalized cultural clusters 
where other art forms prevail and where the symbolic, economic and cultural values 
that are usually attributed to Fo Tan are apparently absent. One of these areas, for 
instance, is Kwun Tong (and especially its sub-district Ngau Tau Kok) that—
allegedly—holds the highest concentration of band rehearsal rooms in the entire city.15 
While some insiders estimate that on average each of the 300 industrial buildings in 
                                                 
15 San Po Kong is considered to be another cluster that is especially popular among performing arts groups.  
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Kwun Tong has accommodated between three and four music groups during the peak 
years, the government usually refers to the figure of 500 arts groups (including 
musicians) that together occupy around 2.7% of industrial spaces in this area. 16 
However, given the illegal nature of many spaces, it can be assumed that the responses 
in official surveys under-represent the non-compliant cultural use of industrial 
buildings (Interviews, 2013; 2014).17  Nevertheless, according to the ADC (2010) 
survey, roughly one third of all industrial arts spaces in Hong Kong are located in 
Kwun Tong, outpacing runner-up Fo Tan that holds approximately one fifth. Thus, it 
almost goes without saying that the city’s longest serving underground venue has 
emerged in the midst of Kowloon East.  
Hidden Agenda, originally used as an apartment and rehearsal room, was 
converted into a livehouse in 2009, primarily to provide a platform for local bands that 
were practicing in other industrial buildings nearby. Subsequently, however, the 
project took its own course and Hidden Agenda has become a crucial address for 
international bands that are on tour in South East Asia, and especially for the strong 
underground music scenes in Mainland China, Taiwan and Japan. The program of the 
venue is usually tailored along alternative genres such as post-rock, folk, punk, 
hardcore, metal, indie pop, reggae, R&B and experimental music. Depending on the 
popularity of the performer, a regular show can attract between 30 and 300 visitors, 
the latter being also the current maximum capacity of the venue. Before Hidden 
                                                 
16 A survey conducted by a commercial research institute for the HKSAR Planning Department in 2011 counted 
504 cultural and creative workshops (including art, music and film studios) in the industrial areas of Kowloon 
Bay and Kwun Tong (Planning Department, 2011). 
17 See Annex for a detailed list of all interviewees.  
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Agenda opened, similar concerts of this dimension had often been restrained to non-
profit youth centers, commercial bars and multi-functional restaurants on Hong Kong 
Island.18 Indeed, venues with roughly comparable capacities can still be found in 
Sheung Wan, Central and Wan Chai, with the difference that they are primarily run as 
bars, cafés, restaurants, clubs or galleries with additional live music.19   
Nevertheless, despite its comparatively non-restrictive physical environment, the 
future for Hidden Agenda is not very promising. Ever since the government introduced 
the measurements for the revitalization of industrial buildings, the venue had to cope 
with significant rent hikes and was forced to move its location twice after disputes over 
rent and land-use violations. Meanwhile, Kwun Tong has become one of the most 
attractive areas for investment and property speculations, following a master plan that 
aims to develop the district into Hong Kong’s second CBD. Nearby government-led 
redevelopment projects at the Kwun Tong Town Centre and the former Kai Tak Airport 
have already commenced.  
 But for all that, Hidden Agenda has still managed to continue its weekly live 
shows, in spite of restrictive regulations for land use, public entertainment and fire 
safety. However, with the increasing pressure from the Lands and Fire Services 
Department, the founders doubt that the venue can remain open until the end of the 
lease in 2015. This time, given the financial and motivational burden that comes with 
it, a third relocation is very unlikely and although other industrial areas do not face 
                                                 
18 See Table 3 (p. 71) for an overview of current livehouse venues, bars and youth centers.  
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immanent redevelopment plans, Hidden Agenda is fully committed to stay in the self-
proclaimed “Kwun Tong Art District”.  
1.2  Research Questions 
This thesis considers Kwun Tong to become a crucial test-bed for the scope and 
capability of Hong Kong’s cultural policy strategies. However, in the face of an 
imminent redevelopment, it is of even greater importance to ask how non-compliant 
spaces such as Hidden Agenda have been able to sustain themselves and how they 
have found room for maneuvers within existing policies and discourses.20  
Hidden Agenda is a very peculiar case study that does actually not represent a 
“regular” cultural space in Kwun Tong, but by offering a niche for independent music, 
the livehouse has rendered the peripheral industrial area both accessible and relevant 
for a community beyond the district. Every weekend around 200 people visit the shows 
in Kowloon East, although their gatherings are—factually—illegal. 
At first sight, this subcultural context certainly offers a wide range of interesting 
foci that might follow common approaches in the field of cultural and urban studies: a 
comprehensive ethnographic study of artists and visitors in this area could give useful 
insights into the social, economic and cultural dynamics of the cluster; similarly a 
venue such as Hidden Agenda could offer an interesting entry point for a critical 
analysis of the local independent music scene and its relation to Kwun Tong; another 
approach could adopt the common critique of creative city models and lay out their 
                                                 
20 Most cultural spaces in Kwun Tong—that serve as venues or interact with visitors on a regular basis—share 
similar concerns regarding redevelopment. When this thesis refers to spaces “such as Hidden Agenda”, it also 
includes venues like Osage Gallery, Musician AREA, HK Farm (now closed), startfromzero, The Salt Yard etc.   
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inherent contradictions with urban planning discourses. All of these would be relevant 
projects, with some of them currently even being realized by other postgraduate 
students in the city. However, when in 2020 Kwun Tong will have become the city’s 
second Central Business District, Hong Kong will have also lost its densest 
agglomeration of creative production. So what is actually at stake here? And do 
cultural policies really matter?  
Since the 1980s and 1990s, globalization, economic changes as well as the rise of 
the creative economy have all triggered reactions across universities, research 
institutions and government agencies in order to address the new challenges for the 
cultural sector. Among these responses, one was formed by the pro-active approach of 
cultural policy studies that emerged from the field of cultural studies and was initiated 
by scholars such as Tony Bennett. However, the development of this new study area 
was also determined and conditioned by various national factors, especially in the 
political and institutional context of Australia and Great Britain at that time.  
Arguably, most of the research in the area of urban cultural policy is informed by 
the disciplines of human geography and sociology as well as by the scholarship from 
specialized creative economy departments and research institutions. The 
comprehensive and ambitious work of scholars such as Lily Kong (on Singapore) and 
Michael Keane (on China) has contributed a lot over the last years to demystify and 
particularize concepts of creativity, clusters and cultural policy in specific Asian 
contexts. However, the case of Hong Kong—with a few exceptions (e.g. Kong, 
2012)—usually only attracts marginal attention in English academic literature, where 
it is often limited to references such as the (yet-to be realized) West Kowloon Cultural 
District, the (rather unrepresentative) Cattle Depot Artist Village or the Cyberport (as 
11 
 
  
 
an IT cluster project that allegedly never lived up to its expectations). Nevertheless, in 
recent years, the emergence of “collective memory” as a public concern has offered a 
new emphasis on the problematic synergies between cultural industries and heritage 
preservation (e.g. Ku, 2010). Besides, there have also been prolific historical accounts 
on Hong Kong’s cultural policy, covering the years before and after 1997 (Ooi, 1995; 
Cartier, 2008).  
However, to my knowledge, there has been hardly any attempt to articulate the 
issues of space and urban planning with the Foucauldian approach of cultural policy 
studies, which aims to understand the governmental domain of culture by analyzing 
institutions and discourses (Bennett, 1995; 1998). This research has identified the 
distinctiveness for cultural policy studies in its focus on the “politics of detail” and its 
emphasis of “governmental power” over concepts such as hegemony. Although the 
case of Hidden Agenda and Kwun Tong poses some crucial difficulties for the 
“usability” of this approach, this thesis nevertheless argues for its “usefulness”—even 
with regard to two particular challenges: 
First, as an independent and non-compliant space, Hidden Agenda operates both 
outside and in opposition to Hong Kong’s public institutions, which, however, does 
not mean that it is only a space of resistance. Celebrating its fifth anniversary as an 
illegal livehouse in 2014, it has managed to sustain despite rising rents, terminated 
leasing contracts and fierce regulations. While these conditions are often subsumed 
under a general hegemonic power, this research aims to analyze and comprehend the 
technologies and tactics that Hidden Agenda has adopted in its various interactions 
with authorities. 
Second, space in itself is a very controversial domain in Hong Kong, where the 
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scarcity of land resources inevitably resonates in debates on urban redevelopment 
projects as well as their necessity, efficiency and utility. However, in contrast to public 
facilities such as museums, theatres or concert halls, the cultural use of private space 
is often only associated with subsidized or commercial activities. Arguably, different 
cultural clusters in Hong Kong have also been subjected to various forms of spatial 
power. Hence, instead of merely foregrounding the ideological origin from the 
perspective of political economy, the research aims to understand the reality for 
cultural spaces by looking at urban planning in detail, how it permeates a wide range 
of policies and to what extent it might accommodate culture within its own 
responsibilities.  
Arguably, the domain of cultural policy studies has no similar anchorage or 
tradition in Hong Kong’s research sector. Nevertheless, as this thesis aims to expose, 
the features and traits of this particular approach might also shed light on issues that 
are often underrepresented in current research on cultural policy. 
It is from these idiosyncrasies that the basic research questions finally derive: 
1. How has Hidden Agenda been determined and changed by the spatial and 
governmental conditions of Kwun Tong’s industrial area?   
2. How has the case of Hidden Agenda informed urban and cultural planning 
processes in Kwun Tong?  
3. How does the case of Hidden Agenda and Kwun Tong relate to cultural policy 
and cultural cluster strategies in Hong Kong? 
 While narrow in scope—in order to stay within the limitations of a master thesis— 
these questions should help us to understand both the destructive and productive 
impact of spatial power on Hong Kong’s cultural production.   
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1.3 Methodology 
At an early stage of this project, the majority of literature was informed by popular 
discourses of creative industries, creative city and creative class—however, the more 
I dealt with the space of Hidden Agenda, the nature of the cultural cluster in Kwun 
Tong as well as the struggle with redevelopment projects, the more it seemed that these 
concepts—while highly relevant for policies and academic works—have limited 
relevance for the actual practices and concerns of the people and organizations 
involved. So instead of establishing a critique of Hong Kong’s discourses that 
dominate cultural policy, this thesis uses the approach of cultural policy studies to 
specifically look at how an illegal cultural space such as Hidden Agenda managed to 
operate for more than five years, how it interacts with different actors, and how 
existing conditions have provided room for maneuvers in the form of tactics and 
governmental power.   
 Therefore, the intended contribution of this research is to test and contest the 
usability of cultural policy studies along three criteria:  
1) its relevance for cultural spaces such as Hidden Agenda, that operate mainly 
outside mainstream cultural policy discourses 
2) its applicability for the domain of space and urban redevelopment, that have 
not been major concerns for Foucault and Bennett   
 3) and, given the national context of its emergence, the feasibility of its 
transfer to the spatial, social and political particularities of Hong Kong. 
By identifying and analyzing the room for maneuvers within policies and 
discourses, this research expands the Foucauldian approach of cultural policy studies 
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to the domain of space and urban planning. For this purpose, the livehouse Hidden 
Agenda is used as a case study to create a confined entry point for a manageable 
holistic investigation at both micro- and macro-level. The selected texts for the 
discourse analysis include official reports, commissioned studies, policy papers, legal 
ordinances, newspaper articles and documentary movies (in particular Hidden Agenda: 
The Movie and Anson Mak’s On the Edge of a Floating City, We Sing), with further 
evidence being provided by zoning plans, event documentations, images and statistics. 
This is complemented by primary data that was collected during numerous field trips 
through direct observations and in-depth interviews with different stakeholders. The 
interviewees include various artists and visitors affiliated with the local music scene 
and Kwun Tong in particular, representatives of Hidden Agenda, the deputy head of 
the Energizing Kowloon East Office (Development Bureau), the owners of four other 
non-compliant venues in Hong Kong and the founding member of the non-profit 
advocacy groups “Hong Kong Culture Monitor” and “Factory Artists Concern Group” 
(see Annex for a detailed overview of all interviewees).  
1.4 Objectives and scope 
Situated in the broad field of cultural studies, this research aims to examine current 
and future policy frameworks, although, given its degree-seeking format, not so much 
out of an aspiration to “intervene directly in bureaucratic and business spheres”, but 
rather to expose room for maneuvers and—if adequate—the “failures and absurdities” 
(Morris, 1992: 470) of existing policies in Hong Kong’s cultural domain. However, in 
order to facilitate an in-depth analysis with a strong focus on policies, the scope of the 
research will also be significantly limited in three areas:  
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In the last years, issues of urban redevelopment have given rise to invaluable 
projects such as the virtual mapping of Kwun Tong Culture, initiated by scholar and 
film artist Anson Mak in 2009. Since then this online platform has created a rich 
database of images and memories around the former Kwun Tong town center, which 
will undergo a complete overhaul until 2020. While the industrial buildings nearby 
must be seen as an integral part of everyday life for the local community, this thesis 
primarily aims to foreground the situation of cultural spaces, which are subjected to a 
different set of urban renewal strategies (“revitalization”) as well as a different 
authority (EKEO) than the former residents of the town center (“redevelopment”, 
Urban Renewal Authority). Therefore this research will be confined to issues of space 
and policy in Kwun Tong’s industrial area only.     
 Another particularity that poses a challenge for this research can be seen in the 
heterogeneous use of industrial buildings in Hong Kong. While there is a significant 
artist community in Kwun Tong, there are nevertheless many other kinds of spaces that 
often use similar tactics in response to policies, whether illegal apartments, restaurants, 
training facilities or shops. At the same time, Hidden Agenda might be generally 
understood as a subcultural space, but given its implications for a much broader 
domain, the proposed methodological approach addresses primarily the governmental 
aspects in relation to space rather than the identity formations of its users (i.e. local 
underground musicians).   
 Eventually, the geographers Leung and Soyez (2009) also identified a missing 
debate around the preservation of Hong Kong’s industrial heritage, despite its 
enormous contribution to the urban identity during the 1960s and 1970s. While the 
valorization of Hong Kong’s industrial buildings in the context of their historical and 
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geographical contingency could certainly open up new approaches, it is unfortunately 
not within the conceptual reach of this thesis. Nevertheless, I hope that my research 
can contribute to new knowledge of organically evolved cultural spaces in Kwun Tong 
and will eventually encourage further explorations within those aforementioned areas.  
1.5 Structure 
The thesis is divided into five parts. Following these introductory notes that 
defined the questions and methodology of the research, the following chapter will lay 
out the theoretical framework, which—in the form of a literature review—covers 
discussions on urban space (Ch. 2.1), cultural cluster and creative city discourses (Ch. 
2.2) as well as cultural policy studies (Ch. 2.3). In the third chapter, the case study of 
Hidden Agenda will be used as an entry point, starting with its spatial analysis in the 
context of Kwun Tong’s industrial area (Ch. 3.1). Drawing from empirical fieldwork, 
the next part will discuss the emergence, development and complex identity of Hidden 
Agenda as well as its tactical maneuvers used within existing policy frameworks. This 
is followed by an analysis of the Energizing Kowloon East Office (EKEO) and a 
juxtaposition of various discourses (Ch. 3.2). Eventually, the third chapter will 
conclude with a comparison between Kwun Tong and Fo Tan by looking at their 
overall sustainability as organically evolved cultural clusters (Ch. 3.3).  
In the fourth chapter, the research will shift the perspective from micro- to  
macro-level in order to analyze the emergence of cultural discourses within Hong 
Kong’s urban planning strategies, illustrated by various models of planned cultural 
clusters in the city (Ch. 4.1). By comparing these official manifestations of cultural 
policy strategies with Kwun Tong, the thesis aims to expose and analyze the dynamics 
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of spatial power in relation to Hong Kong’s cultural development (Ch. 4.2). The last 
part of the chapter will problematize Hong Kong’s culture portfolio and offer 
suggestions for potential changes in its organization (Ch. 4.3). Finally, the thesis will 
be rounded off by a brief summary, the conclusion and further perspectives (Ch. 5).   
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2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 There is nothing but offices, one after the other. 
   (Henri Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 128)  
 
Over the last decade, research on cultural policy across different disciplines—
whether cultural studies, human geography or sociology—has been mainly concerned 
with two domains: the first one usually investigates the “expediency of culture” 
(Yúdice, 2003) by both analyzing and comparing the economic, social and cultural 
impact of creative industries and cultural clusters as well as their political and legal 
framework within which they are promoted, permitted or restricted (Throsby, 2001; 
Crane et al., 2002). The second domain has taken a more critical stance over the neo-
liberalization of culture as “cool capitalism” (McGuigan, 2009)—especially in relation 
to urban social-economic inequalities—by (re)framing concepts such as “cultural 
citizenship” (Stevenson N., 2003; Miller, 2006; Miller, 2011) and the “right to the city” 
(Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]; Harvey, 2012; Brenner et al., 2012). Eventually, both 
academic approaches, albeit from different positions, address the global discourse of 
creativity and its various articulations with city (Landry, 2000), economy (Howkins, 
2001) and class (Florida, 2002).   
At the same time, the inherently territorial scope of policies—whether global, 
national or urban—has given cultural policy debates an important spatial dimension, 
echoed in core concerns over “display” and “accessibility” (Williams, 1989). This 
might also explain why a significant proportion of regional research on creative 
industries and cultural clusters has come out of academic fields such as urban studies, 
19 
 
  
 
geography and architecture. Given the relevance of both cultural policy and urban 
planning in the redevelopment of Kwun Tong’s industrial area, this thesis argues for a 
convergence of these different approaches through a theoretical framework that covers 
the relational issues of space, city, culture and policy.  
The following literature review is therefore divided into three parts: The first 
section commences with an examination of both abstract and material models of the 
production of space, in particular “other space”, and will then move to practical 
concerns in relation to urban planning and gentrification. It will further examine Hong 
Kong’s peculiar spatial conditions and policies. The second part offers a discussion of 
globalized creative city and cultural cluster models and the related emergence of Hong 
Kong’s branding as “Asia’s World City”. Eventually, in the third section, the research 
will engage with the controversial field of cultural policy studies and its struggles with 
notions of value, hegemony, resistance and governmentality.  
2.1 Space and the City 
Space is more than just a physical entity. Instead it holds connotations of time, 
distance, freedom and belonging that have shaped its complexity as an academic 
concept (Berland, 2005). Especially in the urban context, the on-going struggle over 
“the right to the city” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]; Harvey, 1990; Brenner et al., 2012) and 
the resistance against places of dominance (de Certeau, 1984) have produced important 
critical tools to analyze the production of space and its own productive power. While 
this research does not aim to solely focus on an analysis of spatial practices in Kwun 
Tong, the specific otherness and cultural function of the case study requires a critical 
understanding of some fundamental concepts in this domain that will be contrasted in 
20 
 
  
 
the following section.  
2.1.1 The Production of Other Space 
According to French Marxist thinker Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), space must 
be conceptualized as a social construct – or in other words: Space is produced by how 
it is envisioned, organized and experienced by its users, who, in turn, are constituted 
by the economic distribution of place across different social strata. Throughout his 
oeuvre, Lefebvre conceives the urban formations and spatial practices as a result of 
capitalist forces. This has become most explicit in the (often concentric) creation of 
city centers and their surrounding peripheries. “Worrisome groups” are being pushed 
outwards, while access to the center, as a “locus of decision, wealth, power and 
information”, is regulated by the scarcity and hence lopsided value of space (Lefebvre, 
1991 [1974]: 375).  
For analyzing different spatial practices within cities, Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) 
proposes a conceptual triad of space that consists of three interrelated pairs: spatial 
practice/perceived space, representation of space/conceived space, and 
representational space/lived space. These analytical tools not only capture how space 
(including creative space) is produced by the existing materiality (the built 
environment), but also foreground how different agents inform this production through 
their own embodied, mental, and social experience (Carp, 2008: 131).21  
 This dialectical triad of space is echoed in Lefebvre’s macro-perspective on the 
composition of cities. In his earlier work The Urban Revolution Lefebvre (2003 [1970]: 
                                                 
21 See Chapter 3.1 for a more detailed explanation. 
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128-129) distinguished three “urban forms”: isotopia, heterotopia and utopia. While 
the theory of heterotopic studies is usually attributed to Foucault, the concepts of these 
two French contemporaries radically differ from each other (Harvey, 2012a: xvii).22 
For Foucault (1986 [1984]: 24-27) heterotopia are defined by their contrast to u-topic 
places and have a cultural and usually disciplinary function within a society, which he 
further illustrates with examples of cemeteries, brothels, psychiatric hospitals, prisons, 
sacred places, libraries, gardens and festivals (Johnson, 2006). Thus, while Foucault is 
primarily interested in the governmental nature of heterotopic institutions, Lefebvre’s 
concept of heterotopia is determined by its dichotomy to aforementioned isotopia. 
Literally meaning “identical places”, isotopia “are created by state rationalism”, 
whereas heterotopia run against this conformity and become both “the other places and 
the places of the other, simultaneously excluded and interwoven” (Lefebvre (2003 
[1970]: 128).   
This reading is shared by Harvey, who identified in Lefebvre’s heterotopia—in 
contrast to Foucault’s—a revolutionary movement of “a spontaneous coming together 
in a moment of ‘irruption’; when disparate heterotopic groups suddenly see, if only for 
a fleeting moment, the possibilities of collective action to create something radically 
different.” (Harvey, 2012a: xvii). Given the non-compliant and counter-institutional 
nature of Hidden Agenda, Lefebvre’s concept offers a useful framework to analyze the 
production of the other space and its role for a place-bound identity formation.23 
                                                 
22 Heterotopia are “real places … that are formed in the very founding of society-which are something like 
counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found 
within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.” Heterotopia and utopia are 
necessarily reciprocal, best described by Foucault’s analogy of a mirror as convergence of the virtual (utopia) and 
real place (heterotopia) (Foucault 1986 [1984]: 24). 
23 The research area of heterotopology, which is based on Foucault’s oeuvre, has been criticized for its 
ambiguous use of key terms such as “space”, “place”, “site” and “location” (Casey, 1998: 300). However, as 
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Further, by stressing the reciprocity of different urban forms, Lefebvre’s production of 
space favors a dialectical view of contradictions over a fetishization of space 
(Merrifield, 1993), which further helps to expose the relations between non-compliant 
spaces such as Hidden Agenda and the conformity of generic urban areas in Hong 
Kong:   
  “The isotopy-heterotopy difference can only be 
understood dynamically. In urban space something is always 
happening. Relations change. Differences and contrast can 
result in conflict, or are attenuated, erode, or corrode.” 
       (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 129) 
 
 
 Lefebvre juxtaposed the classification of isotopic, heterotopic and utopic urban 
forms with other models, as he argued that the concept of space is far too complex to 
look at from a one-dimensional perspective. Another—what he called—“more 
concrete” grid classifies the users and uses of space according to their public, private 
or mediational characteristics, which are drawn along spatial boundaries that mark the 
“transition from one sphere of control to that of another” (Low, 154). In the city, these 
boundaries are often used as “political devices for social control and discipline” (Low, 
2000: 155) that categorize users and practices along certain aesthetic, cultural, ethnic, 
social or economic values. While such boundaries are often imagined as both 
physically and socially, they are also productive, as humans depend on symbols to 
order and conceive the space they live in. At the same time, boundaries can also 
become spaces of interaction as “locales where different people, activities, and ideas 
come into contact with one another” (Low, 2000: 155). 
                                                 
Johnson (2006) argues, this should be rather seen as a result of translations from French into English (e.g. espace, 
lieu and espacement) than conceptual negligence.  
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 While both Lefebvre and Foucault avoided any geographic distinction between 
the terms “space” (as the general) and “place” (as the specific) (Casey, 1993; Agnew, 
2011), de Certeau (1984 [1980]) put forward a reversed differentiation. For him, a 
place refers to a distinct location that automatically excludes other elements and 
therefore indicates a stable condition. At the same time, space, instead of being the 
abstract dichotomy, is defined as “a practiced place” that is composed of mobile 
elements which imply instability24 (de Certeau, 1984 [1980]: 117-118). In the case of 
urban places such as cultural clusters where the spatial practices of everyday life (de 
Certeau’s main concern) intersect with cultural production and consumption, de 
Certeau’s understanding of space could take over a dominant role, although his concept 
of resistance has been criticized within cultural policy studies (see Chapter 2.3). The 
duality of space and place is again mirrored in de Certeau’s differentiation of strategies 
(management) and tactics (action). Strategies require both the autonomy and stability 
of a place to control power relationships by delimiting the influence of exterior forces 
(de Certeau, 1984 [1980]: 34-39). On the contrary, it is exactly the absence of a 
permanent place and the exposure to other forces that enable tactical maneuvers: 
  “The space of a tactic is the space of the other. Thus it 
must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized 
by the law of a foreign power. […] It operates in isolated 
actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of ‘opportunities’ 
[…] What it wins it cannot keep.”      
      (de Certeau, 1984 [1980]: 37) 
 
In other words: Stable places are managed by strategies, instable spaces by tactics. 
                                                 
24 These thoughts were later echoed in Augé’s (1995: 83-85) elaboration on de Certeau’s understanding of non-
places. 
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In this regard de Certeau’s understanding somehow coincides with another of 
Lefebvre’s analytical grids to classify space. By measuring “the order that exists 
beneath the chaotic surface of space”, Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 366-367) distinguishes 
“spatial planning and development” from productive forces that run against these 
strategies with the aim to establish a “counter-space”. 
 By using a variety of tactics, Hidden Agenda has established a “space of the other” 
that operates across these relational and dialectical concepts of perceived-conceived-
lived space, heterotopic-isotopic-utopic space, public-private-mediational space and 
strategic-tactical space. Chapter 3 will draw upon some of these concepts to analyze 
and understand the spatial production of Hidden Agenda in the context of Kwun Tong’s 
industrial area.    
2.1.2 The Gentrification Trap 
While these spatial theories and terminologies are useful to explain the social, 
economic and cultural nature of urban settings, it is in the domain of urban planning 
where the real battles over space have been fought. More than 50 years have passed 
since the term gentrification was used for the first time to describe the rapid changes 
in London’s residential inner city areas.25 Originally, gentrification referred to the 
appropriation of low-income neighborhoods or redundant factories by more affluent 
classes (in Lefebvre’s terms this would be the capitalist re-appropriation of the center 
by displacing the unprivileged to the periphery), but with the rise of the postindustrial 
city (Ley, 1980), the global city (Sassen, 2001 [1991]), the postmodern city (Clarke, 
                                                 
25 The term was coined by sociologist Ruth Glass (1964), but its sudden emergence does not mean that the 
phenomenon of “gentrification” has not existed before (Clark, 2005). 
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1997, 2003; Wynne and O’Connor, 1998) and the creative city (Landry and Bianchini, 
1995), this narrow meaning, which was mainly derived from American and British 
case studies, has become deficient and too exclusionary to explain similar urban 
dynamics all around the world.26 In response to the increasing “chaos and complexity 
of gentrification” (Beauregard, 1986), Clark (2005) argued for a broader definition to 
focus again on its common causes. He concluded that whether run-down 
neighborhoods are taken over by art lofts, boutique shops and cafés or are revitalized 
from top-down by urban planning authorities and real-estate developers, both of these 
forceful changes are still rooted in the “commodification of space, polarized power 
relations, and a dominance of vision over sight” (Clark, 2005: 24). At the same time, 
with the increasing use of euphemisms such as “revitalization”, “regeneration” and 
“redevelopment”, the term gentrification has become to some extent a positive 
indicator for urban change that is often used interchangeably with neutral 
terminologies such as neighborhood renewal (Smith, 2002).   
It is this ideological appropriation that critical urban theory has since tried to reject 
(Smith, 2002; Brenner et al., 2012). The critique especially takes issue with the 
“celebration of gentrification and its denial of displacement” (Slater, 2012: 189) 
caused by a growing involvement of scholars in policy making and city planning.27 
Lefebvre’s (1996 [1973]) call for an urban revolution has been carried on in the “right 
to the city” movement that became the ideological foundation for critical urban theory, 
primarily advocating the de-commodification of housing (Brenner et al. 2012). Harvey 
                                                 
26 The discipline of geography has struggled ever since over the elasticity of a proper definition. Lees, Slater and 
Wyly’s (2010) comprehensive The Gentrification Reader dedicated nearly 30 pages to this discussion.  
27 This critique is echoed in the debates on cultural policy studies (see Ch. 2.3).  
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(2012b) saw a new urban revolution based on this demand as “past due”, but concluded 
that the current state of crisis requires pragmatic compromises to achieve sufficient 
alliances. Even Lefebvre recognized the right to the city “as utopian (not to say 
pejoratively utopist)”, but insisted that it still must guide “the imperatives … of plans, 
projects and programmes.” (Lefebvre, 1996 [1973]: 196) 
 While Lefebvre created his concepts in response to his experience in Paris in the 
1960s, a more pragmatic debate was underway in the USA. Jane Jacobs’ (1961) The 
Death and Life of Great American Cities, probably the earliest manifesto for urban 
diversity, was an emotional attack on urban planning practices that had for long time 
dominated the development of housing, streets and public spaces in North America. 
Especially detailed is her critique of Le Corbusier, an early 20th century architect 
whose concept of the “Radiant City” has been most influential, also for colonial cities 
in Asia. Siu (1998) argues that Hong Kong’s urban planning has been aligned to most 
of the propositions put forward by Le Corbusier who associated a well-rounded 
development of cities to three conditions: progress over traditionalism, verticality over 
horizontality, and density over sparsity. Although his ideas were driven by his faith in 
providing the physical environment that can achieve a harmonious society where 
human rationality stands above capitalism, Le Corbusier nevertheless conceived the 
complexity, diversity, messiness and individuality of the urban as the ultimate barrier 
for the realization of his vision (Siu, 1998: 64-69). However, Hong Kong’s scarce land 
resources and the resulting hyper-density have practically led to a diversity that 
transgresses Le Corbusier’s zoning approach (Abbas, 1997: 88). Even though 
commercial and residential areas are separated, their spatial proximity results in 
overlaps of spatial practices and sensory experiences that have had crucial implications 
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for regulatory policies.  
 For Jacobs, however, diversity and density was the most intrinsic value of the city 
that—when welcomed and maintained—would eventually also help to overcome 
crime and poverty. The “pretended order” of town planning, built on segregation and 
physical class containment, aggravated urban problems by ignoring and suppressing 
“the real order” (Jacobs, 1964: 15). Therefore, Jacobs argued that urban planning 
processes should facilitate community engagement when designing public places such 
as squares, parks and streets. This participatory and case-sensitive approach, known as 
place-making, has become a popular town planning tool and was also adopted for the 
redevelopment of Kwun Tong (see Chapter 3.2.4).  
 However, Jacobs was also criticized that she had focused merely on the built 
environment for her analysis and hence had failed to recognize that space is a complex 
social product (Zukin, 2009). Being herself a “gentrifier” of Manhattan’s West Village, 
she lost sight of the key process of gentrification, that is “how people use capital and 
culture to view, and to shape, the urban spaces they inhabit” (Zukin, 2009: 17). But 
even today, the affluent classes—including artists and academics—find themselves  
in the same gentrification trap where they both appreciate and defend the aesthetics of 
their own imagined urban authenticity without actually problematizing their own 
complicity in the accompanying process of displacement (Zukin, 2009).28 Therefore, 
as a follower of Lefebvre’s “right to the city” movement, American sociologist Sharon 
Zukin (2009: 245) suggests that the claim for authenticity needs to be equated to the 
                                                 
28 “…by constructing the habitus, latte by latte, of the new urban middle class.” (Zukin, 2009: 18) 
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right of ownership. Only this could enable authentic users within urban planning 
processes, while respecting “the social classes and ethnic groups that have made these 
spaces authentic”. 
2.1.3 Hong Kong: “The Paradigm City” 
Arguably, during the last decade, public debates on Hong Kong’s fading cultural 
authenticity have been on the rise. In the wake of “rapidly transforming identities” and 
a new “desire for history” in this postcolonial era (Erni, 2001: 392), urban 
redevelopment projects triggered fresh concerns over the erasure of collective 
memories. The demonstrations in response to the demolition of Lee Tung Street, Star 
Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier in 2007 and 2008 have not only contested the 
government’s absolute authority over public space, but also exposed the lack of 
recognition for heritage preservation and community values. However, it would be far-
fetched to see the emergence of a substantial “right to the city” movement, even though 
the mobilization against the Guangzhou-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (“XRL”) in 
2009 affirmed growing concerns for people’s livelihood in the city (Chan, 2012: 115). 
Nevertheless, the increasing privatization of public assets that followed Hong Kong’s 
neoliberalization after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, has also fostered resistance to 
“demystify the government’s invented budgetary crisis and to de-legitimize the 
government’s direct subsidizing of private interests” (Chen and Pun, 2007: 86).29 
Interestingly, gentrification has hardly been problematized in Hong Kong’s public 
                                                 
29 Recent examples would include the West Kowloon Cultural District, MTR, Western and Eastern Harbour 
tunnels, Link REIT (and its acquisition of commercial complexes of public housing estates) etc. (Chen and Pun, 
2007).  
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realm (Ley and Teo, 2013). While some academics attempted to identify different 
forms of gentrifying processes in densely populated areas such as Kennedy Town 
(private-led gentrification), Mong Kok (public-led gentrification) and Quarry Bay 
(developer-led gentrification) (La Grange and Pretorius, 2011), Ley and Teo (2013: 
14-16) argued that the lack of critical debates around gentrification is less based on the 
exceptionality of Hong Kong that would render Western models unfit than on a wide-
spread affirmative view that such development is necessary to enhance social mobility. 
As their analysis of newspaper articles has shown, the most common public critique 
of redevelopment projects was related to insufficient compensation rather than 
concerns over a loss of community value.  
Another reason for this reluctance might be found in what Ackbar Abbas (1997) 
called “culture of disappearance”. 30  While his understanding of space is clearly 
informed by Lefebvre, Abbas—as a scholar concerned with architecture—focused 
primarily on the built environment in Hong Kong and how it produces and is produced 
by cultural practices. By attributing the overall specificity of local buildings to three 
distinct features—stylistic receptivity, constant rebuilding and hyper-density—Abbas 
(1997: 80-82) identified three different types of built space: the merely local (colonial 
and indigenous buildings), the placeless (generic office and hotel towers) and the 
anonymous (the endlessly replicated residential, commercial and industrial blocks). 
While the potential disappearance of the merely local frequently stirs up public debates, 
the emotional attachment to the anonymous is significantly lower.31  
                                                 
30 Abbas (1997: 25) developed in this context the concept of déjà disparu, “the feeling that what is new and 
unique … is always already gone, and we are left holding a handful of clichés, or a cluster of memories of what has 
never been”. 
31 There have been noteworthy exceptions in recent years, especially for old “tong lau” tenement buildings (e.g. 
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 Drawing from the conceptual bandwidth of Lefebvre, de Certeau and Abbas, Janet 
Ng (2009: 5) sees urban space in Hong Kong as both “ideologized and political”, 
which can only be properly accessed “through the cultural imagination from within”. 
Although avoiding any reference to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, she further 
argues that the production of space is not only an externally directed imposition of 
state ideologies, but at the same time shaped and altered by individuals that either re-
enforce the material inscriptions of dominant ideologies or try to challenge them. Ng 
(2009: 65-67) is primarily concerned with the ideological imagination of Hong Kong 
as a paradigm for a global capitalist city, where rational politics of a free-market 
economy have produced an orderly space. By analyzing places such as parks, museums 
and shopping malls, she argues that space in Hong Kong is organized according to “the 
aesthetic of capitalism and the bourgeoisie” (Ng, 2009: 68). While Hong Kong also 
becomes another paradigm for the spatial tensions between neoliberalism and 
everyday life, Ng, nevertheless, still shares the positivist approach of resistance with 
de Certeau:  
  “If in discourse the city serves as a totalizing and 
almost mythical landmark for socioeconomic and political 
strategies, urban life increasingly permits the re-emergence 
of the element that the urbanistic project excluded. The 
language or power is in itself ‘urbanizing’ but the city is left 
prey to contradictory movements that counter-balance and 
combine themselves outside the reach of panoptic power.” 
      (De Certeau, cited in Ng, 2009: 3) 
 
 While scarcity and hyper-density are commonly seen to be at the bottom of Hong 
                                                 
Blue House) and historical public housing estates (e.g. Mei Ho House of Shek Kip Mei Estate; Lower Ngau Tau 
Kok Estate). 
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Kong’s on-going struggle over space, the local economy depends at the same time on 
a profitable exploitation of its land resources which often turns the problem to the 
advantage of the proprietor (Abbas, 1997: 86). In contrast to many other cities in the 
region, government revenues generated from properties take up a significantly higher 
share within the general revenue account and are the city’s second most important 
source of income (SCMP, 2014).32 Therefore, out of public (self-)interest, the HKSAR 
government regulates supply and demand for land by releasing new sites in piecemeal 
fashion in order to receive high land premiums from real-estate developers through 
bidding processes. This is made possible by the peculiarity of land ownership in Hong 
Kong, where all land is owned by the People’s Republic of China and administered by 
the HKSAR government. The Chief Executive usually grants leases to individuals, 
institutions or corporations for a certain period of time (50 years or more). As rightful 
owner, however, the government can theoretically revoke ownership rights if there is 
a breach of the leasing contract. 
 
 The first of three parts in this theoretical framework introduced the key concepts 
around the production of space, urban planning and gentrification. While these are 
mainly Western models, references to Hong Kong were made where applicable. 
Generally, the aforementioned spatial and urban theories are concerned with everyday 
life and urban change. As this thesis deals particularly with cultural spaces, the 
following section will discuss how culture has been utilized in urban planning debates 
                                                 
32 While Macau generates around 84% of its revenue through gaming tax, Beijing and Shanghai mainly relies on 
profit, business, salary and value added taxes.   
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in the wake of global economic shifts and the rise of the so called creative economy.   
2.2 Culture and Space 
The industrial areas of Hong Kong are often referred to as vibrant clusters where 
artists and other creative workers are concentrated. The following part will therefore 
carve out the emergence and variations of the cultural cluster concept that is 
inextricably linked with the creative turn in urban planning approaches. Eventually, 
this section will discuss the relevance of Hong Kong’s “Asia’s World City” campaign 
in relation to a new symbolic economy.     
2.2.1 Cultural Cluster Confusion 
The shift from a manufacturing to a post-industrial economy in the 1980s and 
1990s forced many urban planners to think about the reorganization of space. With 
more and more factories being relocated to low-cost production bases in developing 
countries, abandoned industrial buildings in inner city areas or near the waterfront have 
become undesirable markers of urban decline (Mommas, 2009: 46-47). Zukin (1995) 
argues that this development coincides with the rise of the “symbolic economy”, when 
cities recognized and fostered “the production of symbols as basic commodities” and 
the self-conscious “production … of spaces as both sites and symbols of the city and 
of culture” (Zukin, 2001: 1).  
By “placing local cultural activity on the urban agenda in order to improve city 
life and the fabric of the built environment”, a new “cultural planning” approach 
(Stevenson D., 2003: 104-105) set out objectives to articulate a diverse range of urban 
policies. One of the most common strategies was the development of cultural clusters. 
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Clustering, in the general sense, refers to the concentration of certain industries, 
businesses and skilled workers that are able to benefit from each other on grounds of 
proximity (logistics and exchange), specialization (collaboration and competition) and 
resource sharing (infrastructure, talents, research). While originating from the realm 
of industrial economics, the cluster concept has been revived with the rise of the 
knowledge economy—especially in areas of IT, education, design, research and the 
arts where sociality and exchange are deemed crucial factors for productivity and 
success (Marshall, 2003 [1890]; Porter, 1990; Mommas, 2004).33 However, the usage 
of the term across very different fields has also undermined its clarity and universality, 
especially for cultural clusters that have ever since been uncritically subjected to the 
same analytical framework as their counterparts in the business and industry sectors 
(Kong, 2006). 34  Similar to the previously discussed conceptual inflation of 
gentrification, the cultural cluster is nowadays an overstretched signifier that can 
describe almost any kind and degree of a spatial agglomeration, provided it is, in one 
way or another, affiliated with cultural activities or the flexible notion of cultural and 
creative industries (Mommas, 2004; Keane, 2011).35 Overall, cultural clusters can be 
                                                 
33 Alfred Marshall (1997 [1890]) first described the economic concept of a cluster, meaning a certain place where 
related industries decided to group—mainly encouraged by logistic advantages (e.g. shorter transportation 
routes). Later, Michael Porter (1990) introduced the model of a “business cluster” to improve productivity, 
competition and innovation, especially in relation to a rising knowledge economy.  
34 In this thesis the term “cultural cluster” is used interchangeably with “arts cluster” and “creative cluster”. In 
recent years scholars such as Mommas (2009) and Kong (2009) started to use converged terms such as “cultural-
creative clusters” to problematize the definitional ambiguity of cultural and creative industries. For a more 
detailed discussion see Kong (2006, 2009), Cinti (2008), Cooke (2008), Keane (2011) and Hesmondhalgh (2013). 
35 Although the terms “cultural cluster” and “cultural district” are often used interchangeably in English literature 
(“cluster” is supposedly more common in the USA and Asia, while district is preferred in Europe), Cinti (2008: 
71) argued for a significant difference between cultural district as place for production and cultural quarter as 
place for consumption. While this might be true in the narrow European context, these definitions, once 
transferred and translated into other countries, could be discussed ad absurdum, as cultural quarters such as the 
West Kowloon Cultural District (own emphasis) suggest. The industrial area of Kwun Tong is commonly 
described as a cultural cluster, arts area or arts district. Arguably, the term “district” implies a more homogenous 
and place-bound entity, while “cluster” stands for a more flexible concept. Another distinct formulation is “artist 
village” (or sometimes “arts village”), implying a focus on cultural production, especially in the area of fine arts.   
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divided into two categories: the planned cluster and the organically evolved cluster 
(Kong, 2009; ADC, 2010).  
While the cultural planning approach put culture on the agenda of town planners 
and various government departments, it was the notion of the creative city that elevated 
these strategies to a visionary concept. In the wake of the creativity discourse, clusters 
were not only regarded as policy tools to regenerate urban neighborhoods, but also to 
boost innovation and contribute to economic growth. However, the lack of evidence 
as to how this exactly happens has also led to various interpretations of how these 
clusters should be planned in order to be (deemed) successful (Keane, 2011: 46-49).36  
2.2.2 The Creative Turn  
In recent years both planned and organically evolved cultural clusters have been 
increasingly used as place branding strategies by municipal tourism and trade 
departments that see the urge to position the city within a global competition for talents 
and investment. In contrast to concepts of the global or postmodern city that have been 
used as umbrella terms to label commonalities of historical, economic, social and 
cultural changes in different places, the creative city originated outside the academia. 
Inevitably associated with British urban consultant Charles Landry, who coined the 
term in the early 1990s (Landry and Bianchini, 1995) and conceptualized it in greater 
detail a few years later (Landry, 2000), it presents itself as a “toolkit for urban 
innovators” in response to the serious challenges for cities in the wake of Post-Fordism 
                                                 
36 Nevertheless, there seems to be a growing academic advocacy for protecting organically evolved cultural 
clusters from gentrification and real-estate investment—whether in New York (Zukin, 2011), Seoul (Kim, 2011), 
Taipei (Lin and Han, 2012) or Melbourne (Shaw, 2013). Many of these clusters are nowadays recognized for their 
positive impact on the urban image, creative industries and quality of life (see also Ch. 2.3.2).  
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(Scott, 2006). The consequences of this drastic transition from a manufacturing to a 
postindustrial economy have been especially grave for second and third tier cities 
which were secluded from the social dynamics and cultural resources that helped to 
mitigate these challenges in larger metropolises (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993).  
 Landry’s (2000: 246-253) concept of the creative city was indeed driven by 
objectives for employment, social equality and sustainability. It also called for the 
training of “urban literacy” as a necessary skill to read the city from various 
perspectives and to challenge hierarchical orders of planning processes by drawing on 
multi-disciplinary insights, ranging from urban economics to cultural studies: 
  “A full understanding of urbanism only occurs by 
looking at the city from different perspectives. By 
reconfiguring and tying together a number of disciplines 
penetrative insights, perceptions and ways of interpreting an 
understanding of urban life emerges. […] Traditionally, 
however, the discourse on urbanism has been dominated by 
architects and urban designers.”  (Landry, 2000: 247) 
 
 It is in such a (utopist) vision of inclusive and participatory planning, where 
ideological intersections with Lefebvre, Jacobs and Zukin are most evident (see 
Chapter 2.1). Further, Landry’s emphasis on the precondition of institutional reforms 
and the creative permeation of bureaucracy is close to a Foucauldian approach in 
cultural policy (Bennett, 1998) of identifying room for maneuvers within institutions 
and practices (see Chapter 2.3). 
 While this early notion of the creative city remained limited to Western-European 
cultural policy issues37, it was especially the publication of The Rise of the Creative 
                                                 
37 The early concept was often associated with case studies such as Bilbao (Guggenheim Museum), Essen (Zeche 
Zollverein) and the European Capital of Culture project. 
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Class by Richard Florida (2002) —and to some degree John Howkin’s (2002) The 
Creative Economy—that diverted and expanded the concept (and especially the 
terminology) into a controversial academic discourse. Subsequently, the focus shifted 
from cultural capital (both hard- and software) to human capital (talent) as the thriving 
force for urban regeneration.   
 According to Florida, the attractiveness of a city for the “creative class” is mainly 
defined by “3 T’s”: talent, technology and tolerance. In 2012 he extended this model 
with a fourth “T”, territorial assets, giving the “quality of place”—including the built 
environment, the social diversity and the cultural vibrancy—a bigger weight in 
assessing the “creativeness” of cities (Florida, 2012: 280-281). In this context, the 
creative city concept has become a branding and marketing strategy for an increasing 
world city competition. Given this obvious implication of an economic 
instrumentalization of culture, Florida’s approach has been widely criticized by being 
both too generic in its evaluation standards and too exclusionary in its dichotomy of a 
creative and therefore also obviously non-creative class (Marcuse, 2003; Peck, 2005; 
Shaw, 2006; McGuigan, 2009). At the same time, the demand for recognizing cultural 
diversity (Landry, 2000) and street-level culture (Florida, 2002) in urban planning 
processes, has been challenged by the contradictory nature ascribed to planning and 
creativity (Leslie, 2005). In her keynote speech at the Inter Asia Cultural Studies 
conference in Singapore, Kong (2013) summarized eloquently the delusions of the 
creative turn in academia, or what she called “The Seven Deadly Sins”, such as the 
economic reductionism of arts and culture, the romanticization of creative labor and 
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the “fallacy” that creative city models guarantee competitiveness.38 
 Nevertheless, creativity has become a global buzz word for governments to be 
featured in place branding strategies and related urban regeneration projects. This 
development was closely interwoven with the emergence of the creative industries 
discourse that originated in the UK from where similar polices have been rapidly 
disseminated to other parts of the world, including Hong Kong and China (Keane, 
2007). Although many of these concepts have been extensively theorized within 
academic and commissioned scholarship, they nevertheless remain subjected to the 
ambiguous definitions of policy makers in municipalities, provinces and nation-states 
(Peck, 2005; Pratt, 2009).  
 With the establishment of the CreateHK office in 2009 (under the Commerce and 
Economic Development Bureau), the HKSAR government also underlined its 
dedication to develop Hong Kong into a creative city: 
  “Hong Kong’s vision is to become an international 
cultural hub. Indeed, the city is an ideal place for artistic 
expression and creation. Hong Kong’s lively arts and culture 
scene offers a rich variety of events, featuring local and 
international performances throughout the year. It is also a 
leading centre for multi-media, advertising and design.” 
       (Brand Hong Kong, 2013) 
 
The main task of the office is to boost the creative economy, with a main focus on film, 
digital entertainment and design. Although the creative industries have been referred 
                                                 
38 The Seven Deadly Sins of the creative turn: (1) the ambiguity based on the lack of consensus which sectors 
should be subsumed under the term creative industries; (2) the often unsupported presumptions that creative 
industries are economically beneficial and therefore indispensable for economic growth; (3) the economic 
reductionism of art and culture and their instrumentalization for a purely economic agenda; (4) the 
romanticization of creative labor; (5) the preference of creative industries policies to support large conglomerates 
instead of nurturing small and medium-sized enterprises (illustrated by examples from Singapore); (6) the 
inability of creative class strategies to address issues of social equality by reinforcing rather than challenging 
neoliberal development in cities; (7) the “fallacy” that the construction of creative cities will increase 
competitiveness and guarantee economic growth. 
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to as one of Hong Kong’s six pillar industries (Tsang, 2009), their contribution to the 
annual GDP has not exceeded 5% during the last years (HKSAR, 2009, 2012). 
2.2.3 Hong Kong: “Asia’s World City” 
In 2001 Hong Kong introduced its new branding campaign “Asia’s World City” 
after previous attempts such as “Hong Kong Is It” or “City Of Life” had failed to make 
any considerable impact. While the re-branding earned criticism for its high production 
costs and its generic logo, it is still in use in present-day (with only minor design 
overhauls).39 Interestingly, the Central Policy Unit—the highest policy advisor to the 
HKSAR government—invited Charles Landry and Sharon Zukin for a seminar titled 
“The Culture of World Cities” during the campaign launch. 40  Since then, 
commissioned studies have been clearly informed by the concepts of Landry, Howkins 
and Florida (HAB, 2004; ADC, 2006; Kong et al., 2006; Chu, 2011). After the Baseline 
Study on Hong Kong’s Creative Industries in 2003, the Home Affairs Bureau published 
A Study on Creativity Index, which was almost entirely based on benchmarks proposed 
by Florida. While the study attested Hong Kong a generally positive growth of its 
overall creativity index between 1999 and 2004, it did not provide any policy 
recommendations or suggestions for improvement.  
 However, Stephen Chu (2011: 46) argues that this branding campaign has also 
suppressed Hong Kong’s vernacular culture by neglecting the city’s peculiar 
“glocalness”. Drawing from the wording of two influential cultural critics—Lung 
                                                 
39 British PR consultancy Burson Marsteller coordinated the campaign and US branding firm Landor Associates 
created the logo. The entire project allegedly cost HK$ 9 million. 
40 For transcripts of Landry’s and Zukin’s presentations, see: http://www.cpu.gov.hk/txt_en/events_conferences_ 
seminars/conference_20010731.html 
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Ying-tai41 and Chan Koon-chung42—Chu demands that:  
  “Hong Kong has to be aware of the initially self-
reinforcing but eventually self-defeating boom-bust process, 
recognizing that its success was not built on Central District 
Values but vibrant hybridized cultures.” (Chu, 2011: 55) 
 
Instead, the current branding seems to give up on rather than to promote the 
inherent “personality” (Florida, 2002), “authenticity” (Zukin, 2009) and “quality” 
(Landry, 2000) of Hong Kong. It is this quest for distinction that eventually brings the 
debate back to the evaluation and definition of culture within cultural policy discourses.  
2.3 Policy and Culture 
Raymond Williams’ (2002 [1958]: 93) concept of culture has enabled the very 
important articulation of two meanings, “the arts and learning” and “the whole way of 
life”, that also laid the foundation for the emergence of cultural studies in Britain. At 
the same time, however, this complementary (instead of mutually exclusive) 
understanding has also become one of the biggest challenges for a pragmatic 
engagement in policy making which usually requires applicable models, compromised 
decisions and measurable outcomes. 43  In this regard, the sociological notions of 
culture put forward by Bourdieu—especially in relation to “distinction” and “cultural 
                                                 
41 Lung Ying-tai is an internationally acclaimed writer and cultural critic from Taiwan. After serving as the first 
Director of the Cultural Affairs Bureau in Taipei from 1999 to 2003, she joined the Journalism and Media Studies 
Centre at the University of Hong Kong as guest professor. In 2012 she was appointed as Taiwan’s Minister of 
Culture.   
42 Chan Koon-chung gained fame as both journalist and science-fiction writer. His novel The Fat Years has been 
translated into 13 different languages.  
43 Williams (1984), who himself was involved in the British Arts Council between 1975 and 1978, also attempted 
to define “five senses” of cultural policy, which according to him have either a displaying function (in the sense 
of a “national culture”) or a regulatory function (i.e. funding, access and censorship). McGuigan (2004: 64) 
identified these five senses as “national aggrandizement”, “economic reductionism”, “public patronage of the 
arts”, “media regulation” and “negotiated construction of cultural identity”. 
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capital”—have offered useful tools for the assessment of culture in relation to 
economic, social and symbolic factors (O’Brien, 2014: 2).  
 This tension between critique and pragmatism has also led to a substantial debate 
in the 1990s, mainly among British and Australian cultural studies scholars, which 
eventually resulted in the formation of cultural policy studies as a multidisciplinary 
academic—yet practical—field of inquiry (Miller and Yúdice, 2002). The ideological 
discrepancies of that time were accentuated in a tartly dialogue between Jim McGuigan 
(1996, 2004), who insisted on a critical and communicative cultural policy approach 
based on Habermas’ notion of the public sphere, and Tony Bennett (1992; 1998), who 
primarily argued for the “usability” of cultural studies for cultural institutions and 
practitioners (Lewis and Miller, 2003).  
It was in the wake of these intellectual differences that the International Journal 
of Cultural Policy emerged as a platform in 1994, putting forward the definition of 
cultural policy as: 
  “[T]he promotion or prohibition of cultural practices 
and values by governments, corporations, other institutions 
and individuals … [that] may be explicit, in that their 
objectives are openly described as cultural, or implicit, in 
that their cultural objectives are concealed or described in 
other terms.”44  
 
            
While this definition recognizes the ambiguous nature of cultural policy (that is: to be 
always present, even in absence), it primarily relates to the regulatory domain. 
                                                 
44 See: http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?show=aimsScope&journalCode=gcul19 
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However, from a contextual perspective, cultural policy is also a contingent national 
formation that developed along historical and cultural trajectories in different parts of 
the world. Therefore, international comparative analyses are often not only difficult, 
but even inherently problematic (Heinrichs, 1997; Zuser, 2009). Arguably, this is of 
special importance in the Asian context, where the formulation of an explicit cultural 
policy usually coincided with the formation of a new (post-colonial) nation-state. 
Nevertheless, the “culture portfolio” of each country—meaning the positioning of 
culture within ministries—differs drastically in this region (Lindsay, 2004: 63-65). Put 
in the context of cultural globalization, Crane (2004: 12-17) argues that nowadays 
governments can determine their degree of participation through cultural policy 
strategies, particularly by means of preservation, protection and promotion.  
2.3.1 Resistance and Governmentality  
 The set of problems that is always at the bottom of debates on cultural policy is 
based on the intersection of two concepts: culture and value. While the latter refers to 
three different ideas about economics, personal expression and morality, this 
complexity is also mirrored in both Williams’ and Bourdieu’s relational understanding 
of culture. Eventually it is the domain of cultural policy where “the difficulty of 
defining culture and the difficulty associated with value are displayed clearly in the 
attendant problem of making judgments” (O’Brien, 2014: 3-4). Similarly, Throsby 
(2001: 84-85; 2010: 112-113) argues against a conflation of cultural and economic 
value. According to him, cultural value consists of six different characteristics—social 
value, historical value, aesthetic value, spiritual value, authentic value and symbolic 
value—that all together need to be weighed against purely economic rationality in 
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decision making processes. Nevertheless, how cultural value can be adequately 
measured (e.g. Throsby suggests that this is done by elected expert committees and 
societal surveys) still remains one of the most controversial challenges. 
 With the emergence of cultural policy studies, Australian scholar Tony Bennett 
has mainly taken issue with two prevailing concepts in cultural studies: hegemony and 
resistance. For Bennett both of them are highly problematic for a pragmatic approach 
which he sought to establish. In his critique, he first confronts prevailing logics of 
resistance—particularly as described by Stuart Hall and Michel de Certeau—with an 
effective agency of change. For Hall and Jefferson (1993 [1976]), resistance is firmly 
associated with a working class and is operated both outside from and in opposition to 
the dominant culture, with the degree of resistance being determined by a “more or 
less settled cultural equilibrium” (Bennett, 1998: 172). However, for Bennett, the 
“primarily defensive and so reactive qualities” of this oppositional resistance have 
often resulted in a limited political value (Bennett, 1998: 172-173). De Certeau, on the 
other hand, sees resistance not as inherently defensive, but as “a creative, adaptive play 
in the space of the other” (Bennett, 1998: 176), where tactics, as the art of the weak, 
are used to create temporary spaces wherever power seems to be currently absent. For 
Bennett, de Certeau’s poetic account has taken the oppositional resistance to the 
extreme, until it reached the point where the passive tactics as ordinary practices of 
everyday life represent a deprivation of any position in a power-relationship and a state 
of “ubiquitous and all-triumphant” panoptic power (Bennett, 1998: 177). In this 
understanding of resistance, the “effective agency” and the “rich variety of means … 
to take issue with those forms of power which oppose and oppress them” might be 
crucially diminished. Drawing from Foucault’s “microphysics of power”, Bennett 
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tends to believe in a more productive and contextual form of resistance:  
  “Rather, it is that any form of resistance, when looked 
at in detail, in its particular contexts and conditions, will 
reveal itself to be a similarly intricate and complex part of a 
multi-faceted set of practices through which the subordinate 
resist and take issue with, while also seeking both to 
understand and to educate, the cultures that subordinate 
them.”        (Bennett, 1998: 188)  
 
 
Bennett’s comparison of the Gramscian and Foucauldian understanding of 
power is built upon similar arguments to question the uncritical use of hegemony 
within cultural studies. For Gramsci, power is held by a unified ruling bloc from 
where it descends to the subordinated classes that in turn might countervail the 
ideological and cultural forces from above. As such a counter-movement most 
likely arises from unsatisfying living and working conditions, the dominant power 
will try to get the active support from society to legitimize their claim for rule 
(Bennett, 1998: 68-71). It is here where Bennett also identified the main difference 
to Foucault’s governmentality:  
  “Governmental power, by contrast, has no such 
singular anchorage, authorization or function, but is rather 
characterised by the diversity of the objectives which it 
pursues, objectives which derive from and are specific to 
differentiated fields of social management rather than resting 
on some unifying principle of central power.”  
         (Bennett, 1998: 70) 
 
  Gramsci suggests that the politics of consent are achieved through 
“ideological state apparatuses of both state and civil society” that continuously 
expose the subordinated classes to their hegemonic culture and values (Bennett, 
1998: 68). However the Gramscian analysis of power looks “through rather than at” 
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(Bennett, 1998: 68; original emphasis) these institutions, and therefore “fails to take 
adequate account of the more mundane and technical means through which power 
is routinely exercised” (Bennett, 1998: 70). In other words: While Gramsci focuses 
on the mental dimension of conduct, Foucault puts the institutions and technologies 
in the center of power/knowledge production: 
  “The problem is not changing people’s 
consciousness—or what’s in their heads—but the political, 
economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.” 
     (Foucault, cited in Bennett, 1998: 71)  
 
2.3.2 (Sub)Cultural Citizenship 
 Nevertheless, hegemony and resistance have played a significant role in analytical 
accounts on British subcultures in the 1970s (Hall and Jefferson, 1993 [1976]; Hebdige, 
1979). Even if venues such as Hidden Agenda are mainly affiliated with marginal 
music genres, the fluid character of today’s subcultures have transcended most of the 
former social, economic and cultural boundaries that determined their formation. 
Instead individuals are rather enabled by their consumer identity “to create new forms 
of contemporary sociality—small-scale social configurations that operate beyond 
modernist class borders” (Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003: 12; Maffesoli, 1996). While 
sociological analyses have increasingly a-politicized subcultures, some scholars 
argued that the Gramscian hegemony model is far too complex to be left aside:  
   
“In particular, it is the work of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) that is commonly cited here as a way of allowing 
us to move from an ‘inherently’ radical notion of 
subculture, coupled to a monolithic conception of 
dominant culture, to a position that recognizes the 
differentiation and multiplicity of points of power in 
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society and the way that various cultural formations and 
elements articulate within and across these constellations 
of power in complex and non-linear ways to produce 
contingent and modificatory outcomes.”     
  (Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003: 13) 
 
 
 Despite its political connotation, the domain of subculture has also been 
articulated with aforementioned urban creativity discourses (Florida, 2002; Landry, 
2000). For cities that are associated with a prolific cultural diversity (e.g. Berlin, 
Amsterdam, Melbourne), “subcultural economies” have indeed become an integral 
part of their symbolic capital. This has also led to a broader recognition of subcultural 
spaces in relation to urban planning and gentrification (Shaw, 2005; 2013). While this 
might increase their susceptibility for being instrumentalized by local governments, 
the possibility to experience subculture is also a genuine concern for many marginal 
groups. Nick Stevenson (2003: 135) argues that consumer culture has become “one of 
the key places” where “the right to be different” can be effectively pursued. Coining 
the term “cultural citizenship”, he sees a productive interrelationship between 
consumption and the role of citizens:      
 
  “Commercial and aesthetic cultures, in contemporary 
society, continue simultaneously to raise and to obstruct 
issues that can be related to the cultural nature of citizenship. 
Many marginalized groups have searched for an identity 
through a commercial culture, not only because other more 
‘political’ avenues have been blocked, but because it has 
come to signify, increasingly within our culture, a domain of 
pleasurability and identification.”  
        (Stevenson N., 2003: 135) 
 
Recent cases—such as the rejection of a free-to-air TV license for a new broadcasting 
company—have illustrated that “cultural citizenship” is also a relevant concept in 
Hong Kong, especially given its succinct history of cultural policy strategies.  
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2.3.3 Hong Kong: “The best cultural policy is no cultural policy” 
 In the case of Hong Kong, Ooi (1995: 273) summarized the code of practice of 
the British colonial government as “the best cultural policy is no cultural policy”, 
echoing the “present in absence” ambiguity mentioned at the beginning of this section. 
The first heydays of cultural development were between 1977 and 1982 when seven 
of the city’s major representative arts groups were formed.45 In 1982 the government 
created the Council for Performing Arts (CFPA), which—as the name indicated—still 
excluded visual arts and literature from its range of duties (RCB, 1993). Since 1987 
cultural policy debates also started to be regarded as relevant within intellectual circles. 
The drama group Zuni Icosahedron established the Hong Kong Cultural Policy Study 
Group that responded and commented for a few years on policy developments, with a 
major publication in response to the 1993 Arts Policy Review Report by Hong Kong’s 
Recreation and Culture Branch.46 Following part of the recommendations formulated 
by the study group, the government established the Arts Development Council (ADC) 
as a statutory body in 1995, which also replaced the CFPA (Hui, 2007).  
 While the ADC is primarily responsible for allocating direct subsidies, the 
responsibility for cultural policy is currently assigned to the Home Affairs Bureau 
(HAB). The total budget allocated for “arts and culture” in the fiscal year 2013/2014 
was HK$ 3.3 billion, of which 3% were distributed independently by the ADC on a 
project grant basis. Roughly 75% of the budget were spent on the maintenance on 
                                                 
45 Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra, Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, Hong Kong Ballet, City Contemporary Dance 
Company, Chung Ying Theatre Company, Zuni Icosahedron.  
46 Nowadays the Leisure and Cultural Services Department (LCSD) can be considered the equivalent of Hong 
Kong’s former Recreation & Culture Branch (RCB). 
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public libraries, public performing arts venues (including programs such as the Hong 
Kong arts festival), as well as public heritage sites and museums.  
 Although Hong Kong has built up a fundamental cultural hardware across the city 
between 1964 and 2000 (including landmarks such as City Hall, Cultural Centre, Arts 
Centre, Museum of Art, Academy for Performing Arts, Coliseum and Heritage 
Museum), the recent debates on cultural policy revolved around the preservation of 
heritage sites and the WKCD. The latter, which was announced by then Chief 
Executive Tung Chee Hwa in 1998, has since then often been presented as the 
purported savior of Hong Kong’s cultural development, with one of its statutory 
obligations being the promotion and enhancement of “excellence, innovation, 
creativity and diversity in arts and culture”.47 From the very beginning, this mega 
construction—to be literally built from scratch on 40 hectares of reclaimed land—has 
been criticized for its local detachment and its likelihood of falling prey to private real-
estate developers (Lee et al., 2013). Similarly, while heritage preservation has indeed 
received greater attention in the post-colonial era, the commercial purpose often 
remained the driving force behind recent projects:  
  “[I]t is in effect a product of the deepening of the 
market principle under the ideology of neo-liberalism and a 
worldwide expansion of the tourist industry. The gist of the 
discourse is to turn culture, arts and heritage into business 
while passing the economic burden of restoration, 
maintenance and development from the government to the 
private sector.”      (Ku, 2010: 384)  
 
For Ku (2010) this tendency is especially evident in the Central Police Station, a 
                                                 
47 See West Kowloon Cultural District Authority Ordinance (Cap. 601) 
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historical site that will be turned into a creative cluster by the Jockey Club Charities 
Trust (after the government had faced strong resistance against its initial 
commercialization plans). In recent years, similar appropriations of heritage buildings 
have been realized with the Police Married Quarters (PMQ) in Central and the Comix 
Home Base in Wan Chai. However, these clusters do not only serve the creative 
industries, but—together with the WKCD—have also become important displays for 
Hong Kong’s aspiration of becoming “Asia’s World City” (Cartier, 2008: 64).  
2.4 Relevance of Concepts 
 The theories and concepts laid out above defined the framework for this research 
along three lines: the rather abstract domain of space, the methodological approach of 
cultural policy studies and the practical field of urban and cultural planning.  
 Cultural policy studies understands itself as a pragmatic domain that should 
produce usable outcomes. However, in the case of a non-compliant space such as 
Hidden Agenda—that operates outside governmental institutions and technologies—
the thesis will also challenge the limitations of this approach in the light of conditions 
that are distinct to Hong Kong.  
 The first part of this research will focus on the concept of spatial practices that 
have produced Kwun Tong as an organically evolved cultural cluster. It will then move 
to a detailed analysis of organizations, policies and discourses, while addressing both 
the subcultural and commercial (“livehouse”) nature of Hidden Agenda. Within the 
context of redevelopment, the thesis will also refer to previously discussed issues of 
gentrification and place-making.   
 The second part of the research aims to establish an articulation between the 
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domains of space and culture. Drawing upon concepts of urban and cultural 
planning—that (almost literally) build the bridge between spatial production and 
cultural policy studies—the thesis will compare different creative cluster models. 
Eventually, theories of spatial power, cultural citizenship and culture portfolio are 
adopted to offer both conceptual and pragmatic conclusions in relation to Hong Kong’s 
cultural policy strategies and the particular case study of Hidden Agenda.     
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3 CASE STUDY: HIDDEN AGENDA 
“I definitely think that industrial buildings are the 
saving grace for Hong Kong music. For people to be able 
to practice their art and then to also be able to perform 
their art in this space that has no governmental 
restrictions, is a blessing and so no wonder when areas 
like Kwun Tong are in fear of being gentrified that people 
are up in arms about it. But unfortunately, this is Hong 
Kong and when money is the key ingredient to everything 
– that’s what’s going to happen eventually.” 
    (Interview: Farooqi, 2014) 
 
Over the years, Hidden Agenda has been described as an “underground venue” 
(CNN), an “independent music venue” (Time Out), one of “the city’s hottest hidden 
venues” (SCMP) and “the city’s most clandestine live music venue” (Lonely Planet).48 
After all, these paraphrases have one thing in common: they refer to a physical location 
with a cultural value that seems to be rare in Hong Kong. However, when Hidden 
Agenda staged its very first concert, it neither laid claim to a particular “agenda” nor 
pursued the aspiration of becoming an established livehouse. Situated in the midst of 
the organically evolved cultural cluster in Kwun Tong, the venue was rather a product 
of spontaneity and opportunity that gradually turned into a serious commitment to 
Hong Kong’s local music scene.  
 Using Hidden Agenda as a case study, this chapter consists of three parts. The first 
section uses Lefebvre’s conceptual triad to analyze the spatial production of Hidden 
                                                 
48 See: CNN (2011; http://travel.cnn.com/hong-kong/play/hong-kongs-underground-venue-hidden-agenda-
refuses-close-165446); Time Out Hong Kong (2011; http://www.timeout.com.hk/music/features/54390/hong-
kongs-top-new-music-venues.html); SCMP (2013; http://www.scmp.com/magazines/48hrs/article/1271094 
/going-underground-citys-hottest-hidden-venues); Lonely Planet (2013; https://www.facebook.com/hidden 
agendahk/posts/476780715714958)  
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Agenda within and in relation to the surrounding industrial area. The following part 
will scrutinize Hidden Agenda in terms of its operational layout as well as its response 
to regulatory policies outside the cultural spectrum. In addition, this section deals with 
the formation of different discourses and the role of the Energizing Kowloon East 
Office (EKEO). Eventually, for the third part of this chapter, Lily Kong’s (2012) recent 
research on Fo Tan is used as a reference to evaluate the cultural, economic and social 
sustainability of Kwun Tong as a cultural cluster. Challenging the completeness of her 
model in relation to Hidden Agenda, this thesis suggests “governmental sustainability” 
as a fourth category for assessing the conditions for cultural spaces in Hong Kong. The 
findings and citations in this chapter have been mainly generated from in-depth 
interviews with the deputy head of EKEO, representatives of Hidden Agenda as well 
as various musicians and cultural workers that are affiliated with Kwun Tong.49   
3.1 Production of a “Kwun Tong livehouse”  
The 1,400 industrial buildings in the city are the last tangible legacy of a time 
when Hong Kong was one of the leading manufacturing bases in the world. During the 
heydays of industrialization in the 1970s, more than 870,000 people worked in 
factories, fueled by a steady influx of immigrants from neighboring countries. 
The development of Kwun Tong started in the early 1950s with the construction 
of resettlement estates for refugees from Mainland China. In the following years, the 
government reclaimed land along the shoreline of Kowloon Bay. Flat, low-lying and 
                                                 
49 See Annex for a detailed list of all interviewees.  
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in striking distance to a growing labor force, this area was most suitable for the 
establishment of a new factory cluster. As a designated “industrial area”, the 
organization of space in this newly formed part of Kwun Tong differed from its urban 
counterparts that were mainly used for residential and commercial purposes. While the 
social fabric of industrial areas has undergone major changes in the 1980s—when high 
vacancy rates and low rental prices attracted more and more non-industrial users—the 
sustenance of its industrial hardware and inherent spatial practices has also shaped a 
certain governmentality of space. The following analysis uses Lefebvre’s conceptual 
triad to analyze the dialectical production of perceived, conceived and lived space in 
the neighborhood of Hidden Agenda, paving the way for discourse and policy analyses 
thereafter.    
3.1.1 Perceiving Kwun Tong 
The industrial area of Kwun Tong is situated in Kowloon East and separated from 
its surroundings by “natural” borders: to the south-west by a fly-over highway 
construction (Kwun Tong By-pass) and the harbor (Kwun Tong Typhoon Shelter), to 
the north-east by busy arterial streets (Kai Fuk Road / Kwun Tong Road) and the 
viaducts of the Kwun Tong subway line (the former shoreline before reclamation). 
This geographic constellation determines the physical framework in and through 
which the perception and practices of each user take shape. Indeed, the first layer of 
Lefebvre’s conceptual triad—spatial practices/perceived space—is merely concerned 
with an empirical evaluation of the bodily experience of space and how it informs the 
patterns and behaviors of daily routines and rituals. In other words, the production of 
space starts from how people move within physical space while accommodating its 
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sound, texture, smell and shape through all of their senses. Of course, each perception 
differs from one person to another, but they drastically depict the discrepancies 
between internal users and external planners. In reality, the embodied experiences of 
actual locals are often overruled by non-local professionals who claim to provide a 
more sophisticated understanding of the space based on their expertise (Carp, 2008: 
132-134). Being aware of the limitations for such a comprehensive analysis within this 
domain of perceived space, this research will use one of the regular visits to Hidden 
Agenda as an illustration of how the physical characteristics of the industrial area 
inform a distinct set of spatial practices. 
When accessing the industrial area by foot from the nearby Ngau Tau Kok subway 
station, the first section consists of a lengthy underpass that ends at the northern edge 
of Lai Yip Street, from where it is a short walk of around 450 meters to the livehouse. 
The front sides of most premises along the way consist of wide doorways for the 
loading and unloading of goods. While many of the walls are covered with graffiti or 
rent advertisements (see Image 1 below), the dense pattern of factory buildings is only 
occasionally interrupted by private businesses, such as car repair shops. In contrast to 
commercial or residential areas in Hong Kong, the prohibition of retail and 
Image 1: Rent advertisements for vacant units in industrial buildings 
(posted on a wall in Ngau Tau Kok) 
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entertainment businesses reduces the number of outsiders significantly. Consequently, 
sidewalks are less frequented and the fast pace of the city appears slower than usual.  
The few common spaces in this area include a handful of eateries (often former 
industrial canteens), a traditional “dai pai dong”, a sports ground and several 
convenience stores. All of them are widely dispersed, but have also become the 
(literally) common ground of routes and daily rituals for different users—regardless of 
whether they are workers, artists, or visitors. The most apparent sensory transformation 
along this particular way takes place during evening hours. Although some factories 
and stores operate for 24 hours, traffic nearly ceases at night and people start walking 
freely across the streets rather than making detours through pedestrian crossings. 
Meanwhile, the industrial noise that dominates the soundscape during the day is 
replaced by noticeable silence. However, when turning from the main roads into back 
alleys this quiet moment gives way to muted sounds from nearby band rehearsal rooms. 
From the outside Hidden Agenda is rendered invisible (see Image 2 below). No 
banners or street signs indicate the right direction or address. At night those in the 
know enter the venue by slipping through a small gate in the middle of a closed garage 
Image 2: 15-17 Tai Yip Street, Kwun Tong, the industrial 
building where Hidden Agenda is currently located 
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door and by taking one of the spacious industrial elevators to the second floor. The 
space itself appears dark and dimmed. The windows are covered with cloth in order to 
block the light from outside and the walls are plastered with posters and graffiti.  
3.1.2 Conceiving Kwun Tong 
While the previous part aimed to sketch the sensory and experiential domain of 
spatial practices, the significance of Hidden Agenda lies rather in its contribution to 
conceptualizing the idea for the cultural use of industrial buildings, which is theorized 
within the second pair of Lefebvre’s triad, representations of space/conceived space. 
It mainly refers to how people make sense of and think about the space in which they 
move while simultaneously understanding this process as a mental activity that is 
reflected (and to a certain extent materialized) in plans, signs, models, theories, and 
discourses. In praxis, the formulation, interpretation, and opposition of laws and 
regulations play a significant role in this process and are therefore the main examples 
that are used to illustrate the duality of representations of space/conceived space 
hereafter.   
As previously explained, the development of different urban areas in Hong Kong 
is primarily determined by town planning zones that compartmentalize the land 
according to its most suitable and therefore strictly defined use.50 In order to stimulate 
the anticipated regeneration of Kwun Tong, the government rezoned its industrial area 
into “other specified uses (business)”. This adjustment entailed that the conversion of 
                                                 
50 One purpose of this regulation is to avoid any unauthorized and sudden change in the urban landscape, such as 
the construction of an apartment high-rise within a country park or industrial area, where the accommodation of 
residents seems to be inappropriate, unsafe or inexpedient. 
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industrial buildings into commercial space—and hence the construction of new office 
towers—would be legally guaranteed. However, this also contested the continuation 
of the site-specific practices and routines of industrial workers and artists.  
Therefore, the recent development needs to be understood in relation to a more 
fundamental change in conceiving the expediency of space in industrial areas triggered 
by the introduction of government measures to revitalize industrial buildings in Hong 
Kong. Prior to this, non-industrial tenants such as artists offered an opportunity for 
owners to generate income from otherwise unprofitable objects. Given that most of 
these spaces remained private studios and were therefore literally kept out of sight 
from public discourse, a non-compliant use of industrial buildings was generally 
tolerated, although it seemed to be in conflict with existing legislations and must have 
been noticed by authorities as early as 2001.51 However, as industrial areas in Hong 
Kong are not conceived as merely redundant and visually unpleasant anymore, a 
master plan such as the transformation of Kwun Tong into another CBD has been 
turned into an exemplary representation of urban redevelopment that simultaneously 
excludes other conceptions and spatial practices, regardless of whether their nature is 
industrial or creative.  
Eventually, at the end of 2012, the authorities aligned the physical representations 
with their own conceptions and changed road signs in the district accordingly from 
“industrial area” to “business area”, which appeared not only diametrical to the visual 
dominance of the rather gritty industrial buildings, but also to how some users thought 
                                                 
51 In that year eight fine arts students from CUHK organized the first open studio event in Fo Tan.   
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about and imagined their space. Some local artists strongly resisted this imposed 
change in representation. They started a counter-campaign based on guerrilla tactics—
such as graffiti and stickers—to articulate their own conception of space, proclaiming 
the establishment of the “Kwun Tong Art Area” instead. 
Although these divergent views of conceived space eventually led to the 
emergence of political activism, which is undertaken by groups such as the Factory 
Artists Concern Group and R.I.P., a common space such as Hidden Agenda offered a 
symbolic site for the contestation and negotiation of these dominant concepts.  
However, it is also necessary to recognize that a space such as Hidden Agenda has 
been produced by the rigid town planning zones as much as they have negated it. For 
instance, the strict division of residential and industrial areas renders common 
problems otherwise associated with nightlife venues, such as noise nuisance or 
execution of closing hours, negligible. Simultaneously, the lack of traffic, street life 
and residential use naturally leads to the allocation of fewer resources for surveillance 
of that area, which is reflected in a less apparent presence of the law. Nevertheless, 
other grounds still remain upon which the existence of Hidden Agenda is constantly 
challenged, such as fire safety regulations, liquor licensing, hygiene, and  
entertainment definitions (see Ch. 3.2.3).  
3.1.3 Living Kwun Tong 
While the previous two sections, by offering selective descriptions, aimed to 
illustrate the dialectical relationship between spatial practices and representations of 
space (or perceived and conceived space), the third part of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad 
goes beyond these understandings. The duality representational space/lived space is 
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where both the perceptible and conceivable aspects of space extend to a deeper 
meaning that might not be adequately expressed other than symbolically (and therefore, 
most often, though not solely, creatively or artistically) (Carp, 2008: 135). Even for 
Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 40) this part of the triad is “highly complex and quite peculiar, 
because ‘culture’ intervenes here”.  
On stickers issued for its fourth anniversary in 2013, Hidden Agenda defined itself 
as a “space for live” in a “Kwun Tong art district”, hinting at its symbolic role for a 
larger community that might not necessarily address and be of any actual concern to a 
broader public. However, by filling the void of a mid-sized live venue for local and 
foreign music acts, it has not only received international media exposure, but has also 
been given a certain extent of recognition from foreign institutions. When Hidden 
Agenda needed to undertake its forced relocation at the end of 2011, it decided to film 
the entire process and the ongoing negotiations with different authorities. The resulting 
documentary, Hidden Agenda The Movie, has since then been screened during 
numerous occasions in Hong Kong and other cities in South East Asia, building up a 
transnational discourse that also became part of Hong Kong’s official contribution to 
the 2012 Venice Architecture Biennale. In this regard, Hidden Agenda draws upon its 
quality of being—what Eric Ma (2002a) called—a “translocal space” that is inspired 
by practices, plans and symbols from abroad (in this case, other famous music venues) 
and reproduces them by using the resources that are locally available. This makes the 
space not only universally recognizable (even without knowing about its socio-spatial 
context), but also helps to facilitate an articulation with translocal spaces in similar 
situations.    
In contrast, the on-going redevelopment plans for Kwun Tong under the broader 
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vision that “Kowloon East should become another premier CBD of Hong Kong to 
support our economic growth and strengthen our global competitiveness” (EKEO, 
2013a) reflect the official definition of a social and mental privilege that Lung Yingtai 
(2004) famously called “Central District Values” (Chu, 2011: 48). These values not 
only permeate the logic of the city’s urban planning, but also create their own 
representational spaces (with a modern skyline as its materialized symbolic economy) 
that manifest themselves in the lived experience of the users as the one “true space”.  
After having laid out the external factors and spatial practices that have produced 
Kwun Tong’s cultural cluster, the following part will look at the internal 
transformations and the prevailing discourses from the viewpoint of Hidden Agenda 
as a non-compliant livehouse.   
3.2 Hidden Agenda: Space, Policies, Discourses 
In 2008, H., one of the co-founders of Hidden Agenda, moved to an industrial 
building in Kwun Tong, where space was larger, more affordable and less regulated 
than in Hong Kong’s residential areas. While using it primarily as an apartment, he 
also set up a rehearsal studio to which he occasionally invited friends to play informal 
live gigs. Given the lack of regular performance venues for the large number of bands 
in Kwun Tong, the establishment of a livehouse seemed to be the next logical step.  
Initially, H. used the name “Hidden Agenda” for his former retail shop in 
Causeway Bay, where he sold t-shirts and head shop utensils as reference to drug-using 
countercultures.52  However, since associated with a non-compliant livehouse, the 
                                                 
52 Head shops sell paraphernalia that can be distributed legally. 
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name has gradually taken up ironic and political connotations. As suggested in the 
previous part, while Hidden Agenda is indeed a—purposefully—hidden heterotopia 
that is placed at the cultural and spatial periphery of Hong Kong, it also became a 
symbolic space for resistance that helped to exemplify the conception and significance 
of industrial buildings for local artists, particularly musicians. 
3.2.1  Generation Gap 
Since its emergence in 2009, Hidden Agenda relocated twice and has been 
undergoing drastic spatial and organizational changes. However, the eviction from its 
previous sites also created new opportunities and challenges.53 During an interview 
for this research, one co-founder referred to the different locations of Hidden Agenda 
as the first, second and third generation, indicating a rather controversial evolution of 
this space over the last years (see Table 1 on p. 62 for a comparative overview of all 
three generations):   
  “When we started in the first venue, there was no rule. 
We just invited friends to run the show. If they wanted to play 
until 3 am, we just did that. It was not about how to sustain 
the venue. It was totally not. But now we have to pay a huge 
rent every month, so a lot of things have changed.”  
      (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013) 
 
 The first generation of Hidden Agenda was housed in Choy Lee Industry Building 
(1A, 46 Tsun Yip Street) and measured around 2,000 sqf.54 At this time, any economic 
concerns were still secondary. The basic rent was covered by H. who anyway used the 
                                                 
 
 
54 2,000 square feet (sqf) = 185 square meters (sqm) 
61 
 
  
 
space for his private purpose and any income generated from ticket and liquor sales 
was immediately re-invested in better music equipment. Most of the musicians and 
visitors remember the first venue as a very casual place where no particular rules 
applied. However, shortly after the government introduced the revitalization 
measurements for industrial buildings, the landlord seized the opportunity to sell the 
premise and H.’s contract was eventually terminated. The “Immediate Closure 
Concert”55 in January 2010 lasted for two days and featured more than twenty local 
bands. One month later, Hidden Agenda and concerned musicians organized a protest 
march to the office of the Arts Development Council, asking the question why an 
organic and vibrant cluster is subjected to a top-down “revitalization”.56 During this 
demonstration representatives of Hidden Agenda delivered the decorated metal door 
of the first venue to the ADC and asked the council to keep it until it provides sufficient 
support. Joined by artists from Fo Tan, this also became the starting point of the 
Factory Artist Concern Group as the first comprehensive advocacy group across 
different cultural sectors. By the end of 2010, the ADC eventually conducted the 
aforementioned survey on the cultural use of industrial buildings, which was the first 
scientific proof that cultural users in those areas have reached a significant dimension. 
 Despite its sudden eviction, Hidden Agenda established itself as a livehouse 
within the first year and filled a void in the local music scene. The small and informal 
character of the first generation was beneficial for drawing less attention from 
authorities, but it soon reached its physical limits in terms of capacity and cost recovery. 
                                                 
55 Chinese title: 馬上封音樂會 
56 The Chinese name of the protest was 生勾勾被活化大遊行 
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Being still primarily a living space and rehearsal studio at that time, the closure of 
Hidden Agenda exposed the general threat of a sharp increase in land value and rent 
by the government’s new approach to industrial buildings.   
   Table 1: Overview of Hidden Agenda's "three generations" (own table) 
 
 Nevertheless, in March 2010, Hidden Agenda opened its second generation in Ko 
Leung Industrial Building (6/F, 25 Tai Yip Street) which has already become infamous 
for housing a significant number of rehearsal rooms (see Image 3 on p. 63). The 
premise itself had no permanent security guard and was poorly maintained, which 
enabled H. to negotiate a monthly rent of HK$ 10,000 for a gross floor area of 4,000 
sqf (370 sqm). Compared to the previous space, the new location was solely used for 
the purpose of a livehouse, which eventually also triggered more serious concerns 
about the management, efficiency and sustainability of the venue. Given the initial 
learning process and financial investment, the organizational transformation took 
several months, during which H. subsidized around 40% of the rent.  
Hidden Agenda 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 
Time 01/2009-01/2010 
(1 year) 
03/2010-12/2011 
(1 year, 9 months) 
02/2012-present 
 
Size 2,000 sqf 4,000 sqf 4,000 sqf 
Rent                                                                            n/a HK$ 10,000 HK$ 25,000 
Income tickets/liquor tickets/liquor tickets 
Program focus local local/international international 
Eviction lease terminated 
(premise sold after 
introduction of 
revitalization 
measurements) 
lease terminated 
(potential land use 
violation) 
n/a 
(currently 
investigation 
regarding land use and 
fire safety violation) 
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The comparably large space allowed the booking of better known artists that also 
attracted more visitors from other parts of Hong Kong. During the second year in the 
new building, the number of monthly shows increased steadily and for the first time 
Hidden Agenda could operate completely self-sustained, with liquor sales contributing 
a significant proportion to the income. Eventually, Hidden Agenda has also become an 
established brand for Hong Kong’s underground scene that received attention from 
Taiwanese Minister of Culture Lung Ying-tai, the Consulate General of France and 
international media such as CNN, The Guardian, Huffington Post and China Daily. 57 
The success and popularity of the second generation is often attributed to the gritty 
appearance of the space that can be aligned with the “translocal imagination” (Ma, 
2002a) of other subcultural locations. In particular, people started comparing Hidden 
Agenda with CBGB, a former underground venue in New York, that—although shut 
down in 2006—is widely considered to be the forerunner of contemporary livehouse 
                                                 
57 Lung Ying-tai met with representatives of Hong Kong’s music scene during her official visit in November 
2012, including singer Anthony Wong (黃耀明) and members from Hidden Agenda and Backstage Live 
Restaurant. In 2011 Hidden Agenda was an official venue of the festival Le French May, during which police 
showed up to inspect the livehouse.  
Image 3: The abandoned second generation of Hidden Agenda 
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culture. For Hidden Agenda this reference also meant that it had achieved a certain 
subcultural credibility which was not only confined to Hong Kong.   
  “The second generation was right in between some 
dodgy-ness and some coolness. We (…) got bigger and more 
developed. But people referred to the CBGB, because the 
toilet was still crap, covered with different stickers and paint 
jobs … [A]ctually the visitors told us what CBGB was … we 
didn’t have a clue.” (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013) 
 
However, during the heyday of the second generation, Hidden Agenda’s conflicts 
with different authorities increased. Representatives from several government 
departments as well as police officers controlled the venue frequently and instituted 
procedures on several grounds, ranging from the lack of an entertainment license to 
the violation of land use regulations. By the end of the year 2011, the landlord yielded 
to the Lands Department and terminated the lease with Hidden Agenda precociously. 
During these months of investigation, Hidden Agenda reacted once more with a public 
campaign, emphasizing that its resistance is not just for the sake of the venue, but the 
Kwun Tong music cluster at large: 
  “[D]enying the fact that we are a music Live House 
could be the best decision. But if we deny, at the same time 
we justify this pathetic cultural policy, and all the band 
practice rooms, galleries and theatres that rely on factory 
buildings can only operate under the dim light. We have to 
clarify that Hidden Agenda is not a pub, not a multi-purpose 
venue, people come for the music, music IS the very purpose 
(…) Kwun Tong industrial area is the most important 
breeding ground for the HK music scene, it is a MUST for a 
Live House to sit right in the middle of this cluster.”58 
      
Before the final closure on New Year’s Day 2012, Hidden Agenda organized 
                                                 
58 See: https://www.facebook.com/notes/hidden-agenda/hidden-
agenda-%E7%99%BC%E8%A1%A8%E6%9C%80%E6%96%B0%E8%81%B2%E6%98%8Estatement-from-
hidden-agenda/215797808450757?fref=nf 
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“Relocation Live”, a four day event on two consecutive weekends, in order to raise 
funds for moving to a new location in Kwun Tong. Retrospectively, the second 
generation of Hidden Agenda was both a result of accumulated experience and a more 
concrete understanding of translocal livehouse culture. At the beginning, the financial 
capability and commitment of co-founder H. allowed an organic growth by steadily 
adapting to the new spatial and economic conditions. While the low rent, the grittiness 
of the building and the overall lack of surveillance still created a rather unrestricted 
atmosphere, it was the bigger capacity and the more diversified program that 
eventually increased the publicity of the space and attracted more people from beyond 
Kwun Tong. Subsequently, however, Hidden Agenda also came into the government’s 
field of vision.  
The third generation of Hidden Agenda opened in February 2012 in Wing Fu 
Industrial Building (2A, 15-17 Tai Yip Street), only a few buildings further down the 
road. With an area of 4,000 sqf, the venue is of similar size as the previous one and 
can host shows for up to 300 people. However, the overall conditions of the premise, 
with two modern elevators and guards on duty, as well as the on-going valorization of 
property in the industrial area have raised the fixed costs significantly. When they 
settled for a monthly rent of HK$ 25,000, which is two-and-a-half times the amount 
paid for the second generation, Hidden Agenda was once more forced to adapt to the 
situation. While again becoming more professionalized, it seemed difficult to keep up 
the image of the previous location.  
  “The third generation now is really, really established 
in the way we can possibly run it. I think the essence got lost. 
If certain people come around now, they won’t recognize it 
anymore as a CBGB.” (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013) 
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 From the very beginning, Hidden Agenda has been operated as a non-commercial 
venue. Friends worked voluntarily without remuneration and any surplus was 
reinvested in the project. This loose structure was also reflected in the organization of 
the space. Among the core team of volunteers, which could be up to 20 people, all 
matters were thoroughly discussed and decisions were made collectively. However, 
starting with the third generation, even more commitment was required. Meanwhile, 
two members, who work for Hidden Agenda in a full time capacity, receive a monthly 
compensation, provided that there are sufficient funds available after all other expenses 
have been paid. However, this shift to a more hierarchical management of the 
livehouse also led to internal tensions:  
  “There are always different agendas between the 
volunteers … Actually, all of them put their personalities … 
into Hidden Agenda. Now [the] ideology changed … in 
terms of effectiveness [and] tidiness. Some … want very 
strict rules how the venue should be used.”  
      (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013)  
 
One of the most contentious issues was about sponsorship. While some argued that a 
commercial sponsor would undermine the nature and ideology of the space, for others 
the cooperation with an audio company was merely a rational decision. Further 
tensions appeared in relation to the program. In the beginning, Hidden Agenda was  
especially dedicated to promoting the local music scene, but the bigger space and the 
aspiration to accommodate diverse music genres has led to an increasing 
internationalization of shows. In the past, around 80% of all featured bands came from 
Hong Kong and Mainland China, but in 2013 this ratio was almost reversed.  
  “[A]fter some really serious meetings … we realized 
that we lost the very essence of Hidden Agenda, to promote 
our local music.”   (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013) 
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In addition, Hidden Agenda has also lost ground on subcultural music genres that can 
only attract a very limited audience. Given the fixed costs and the relatively large space 
of 4,000 sqf, shows for 20 to 30 people are hardly viable from an economic perspective. 
In recent months, this niche has been filled up by smaller venues such as C.I.A. in 
Kwai Chung and the new Musician AREA in Kwun Tong. If Hidden Agenda receives 
inquiries for experimental music, they will usually refer the artists to them. (See Table 
2 below for a summary of landmark events in relation to Hidden Agenda.)  
     Table 2: Overview of landmark events in relation to Hidden Agenda (own table) 
3.2.2 Hybrid Space: illegal, sub-cultural, commercial? 
 Given its contradictory transformation, Hidden Agenda appears as a hybrid space 
that operates across different spatial identities which are only tied together by the 
2000/2001 Industrial buildings are increasingly used by non-industrial users, including 
many visual artists and musicians 
09/2005 First “guerrilla gig” near Kwun Tong Ferry Pier 
01/2009 Hidden Agenda (1st generation) opens  
10/2009 Government introduces “measurements to revitalize industrial buildings” 
01/2010 Hidden Agenda (1st generation) is closed down 
02/2010 Protest march to ADC, subsequently formation of the Factory Artist 
Concern Group 
03/2010 Hidden Agenda (2nd generation) opens 
11/2010 ADC survey on cultural uses of industrial buildings is published 
7/2011 Hidden Agenda receives letter from Lands Department to leave the premise 
10/2011 Government reveals plans to transform the Kwun Tong industrial area into 
the city’s second CBD 
12/2011 Hidden Agenda (2nd generation) is closed down 
02/2012 Hidden Agenda (3rd generation) opens 
07/2012 Energizing Kowloon East Office opens  
01/2013 Fly the Flyover01 underneath the Kwun Tong bypass is opened to public 
01/2013 The need for “arts/creative space” is for the very first time mentioned in the 
annual policy address of the Chief Executive 
02/2013 Hidden Agenda celebrates its 4th anniversary 
05/2013 Hidden Agenda launches the “Exterminating Kowloon East” campaign 
11/2013 EKEO starts a “market sounding exercise” to find potential NGOs to manage 
the flyover space on a long-term contract 
01/2014 Musician AREA moves from Kwai Chung to Kwun Tong 
68 
 
  
 
heterotopic nature of Kwun Tong’s industrial area. This section analyses the relational 
meanings of Hidden Agenda as a space for subculture, a livehouse and a non-compliant 
space.  
 As a non-compliant space in an industrial building, Hidden Agenda shares an 
identity with other illegal places, many of them are small businesses such as training 
centers, indoor football courts, pet crematoriums, restaurants, war game venues and 
retail shops. As not all of them dare to operate as openly as Hidden Agenda, they often 
depend on word-of-mouth and informal channels to attract customers. Up until now, 
however, there has been no significant research about the history and diversity of 
illegal practices in Hong Kong’s industrial buildings. All in all, cultural venues such 
as Hidden Agenda only represent a small part of Kwun Tong’s non-compliant spaces 
that make use of the temporary absence of power. However, the formation of alliances 
in resistance to the revitalization plans of the government has turned out to be rather 
difficult, not only with other users, but even within Kwun Tong’s cultural sector.  
  “When we talk with other activists in Kwun Tong, we 
realized we failed from the very first beginning, because the 
notion of the right to the city wasn’t introduced in the right 
way. I think the majority still thinks the development has to 
go like this way. And when it comes to political action, a 
lot … are not ready for this. At the protests we organize in 
Kwun Tong, we always have familiar faces, maybe 30 
people or less.”  (Interview: Hidden Agenda, 2013) 
 
 In contrast to urban redevelopment projects under the URA that often directly 
intervene with the acquisition and conversion of buildings, Kwun Tong’s induced 
gentrification has rather confirmed the wide-spread affirmative view that such 
development is necessary to enhance social mobility (Ley and Teo, 2012). 
Nevertheless, it has also pressurized landlords that used to be sympathetic of creative 
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spaces prior to the revitalization project. Given the rapid valorization of land, industrial 
buildings have become objects of investment and the—theoretical—threat by the 
government to dispossess owners in case of land use violations has gained weight in 
recent years (Interview: Chow Chun Fai, 2013).   
    As a subcultural space Hidden Agenda is—above all—dedicated to the promotion 
of marginalized music genres that have remained underrepresented within Hong 
Kong’s live music scene. However, far from being contained within rituals, styles and 
“restrictive class-based homologies” (Weinzierl and Muggleton, 2008: 6), as put 
forward in the early emergence of subcultural studies in Great Britain (Hall et al., 1976; 
Hebdige, 1979), Hidden Agenda very much transcended any social and cultural 
boundaries. Arguably, the venue does not represent a coherent subcultural movement 
in Hong Kong, which also enabled its significance across diverse genres.  
  “When Hidden Agenda opened up and filled this 
incredibly important void giving us all a place to watch, 
perform and organize shows – it kick started a new level of 
music in Hong Kong. It also raised the maturity of a lot of 
people, so [they] started becoming more professional 
about … shows.”   (Interview: Farooqi, 2014) 
 
While the first concerts of local bands only attracted a small circle of people, Hidden 
Agenda’s growing size and profile also changed the composition of visitors. Now, 
international shows are often frequented by a mixed audience of locals and non-locals. 
Nevertheless, in addition to its cultural work, Hidden Agenda’s specific subcultural 
value also derived from its location. Being a heterotopic (“underground”, “alternative”, 
“illegal”) and self-reliant (“indie”) space in Kwun Tong, it shares an identity with 
cultural producers in nearby industrial buildings (“We are from the factories”). Both 
audience and participants have shaped the spatial practices that operate within and 
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around Hidden Agenda. However, while this thesis has not adopted a sociological 
approach to analyze the social, cultural and economic background of visitors or 
musicians, the detachment of spaces such as Hidden Agenda from distinct subcultural 
formations also suggests a less significant role of the audience in contributing to the 
struggle over spatial power in Kwun Tong.   
 Eventually, as a self-dependent livehouse, Hidden Agenda is a place for cultural 
consumption and therefore—conceptually—part of Hong Kong’s creative industry. 
Since 2009, the venue was continuously forced to improve efficiency and to work 
along economic rationales, sharing the same concerns with other music venues in the 
city. While it understands itself as a non-commercial space, Hidden Agenda 
nevertheless has approached an “immovable paradox” (Harvey, 1989: 238): In spite of 
its opposition to the capitalist logic of Kwun Tong’s urban redevelopment, it had to 
engage with “question[s] of value” and “the necessary organization of space and time 
appropriate” to its own reproduction (Harvey, 1989: 238). In order to promote concerts 
and attract as many visitors as possible, Hidden Agenda adopted diverse marketing 
tools and by April 2014 it accumulated more than 10,000 followers on its Facebook 
page.59  There have been a few other livehouse venues in Hong Kong that can be 
compared with Hidden Agenda in terms of location, program and size (see Table 3 on 
p. 71 for a detailed overview), but currently the Kwun Tong livehouse is the only 
factory space that operates on a weekly basis. From time to time, Musician AREA 
(Kwun Tong), C.I.A. (Kwai Chung), Love Da Café (San Po Kong) and Rock Angel 
Band House (Fo Tan) organize single shows for a limited audience. 
                                                 
59 In comparison, the page of “Backstage Live Restaurant”, a livehouse in Central, counts around 6,500 “likes”.  
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Table 3: Selective overview of most significant past and current livehouse venues in 
Kowloon, Hong Kong Island and New Territories (own table) 
 Nature of business  Location Legal status Size 
Rock Angel 
Band House 
(since 2014) 
“livehouse”: renting of 
venue 
New Territories, Sha 
Tin, Fo Tan industrial 
area 
n/a max. 
150 ppl. 
C.I.A. 
(since 2013) 
“art gallery/experimental 
art space”: tickets, 
merchandise 
Kowloon West, Kwai 
Chung industrial area 
n/a max.       
80 ppl.  
XXX 
(since 2011) 
“art gallery, art space, 
electronic music club”: 
tickets, liquor sales 
Hong Kong Island 
(NW), Sai Wan, 
Western District 
(before: Sheung Wan) 
registered 
business (liquor 
license) 
max.  
200 ppl. 
Beating Heart 
(2011 – 2013) 
“livehouse”: tickets, 
renting of venue, 
beverage, recording 
Hong Kong Island 
(NW), Shek Tong 
Tsui (industrial 
building) 
n/a max..     
200 ppl. 
Strategic 
Sounds (2011-
2012) 
“livehouse/underground 
club”: tickets  
Kowloon East, Ngau 
Tau Kok, Kwun Tong 
industrial area 
n/a max.  
80 ppl. 
Hidden 
Agenda 
(since 2009) 
“livehouse”: tickets, 
beverage, merchandise, 
renting of venue 
Kowloon East, Ngau 
Tau Kok, Kwun Tong 
industrial area 
n/a  max.  
300 ppl.   
Musician 
AREA 
(since 2009) 
“livehouse”: renting of 
music and lighting 
equipment, renting of 
rehearsal rooms, music 
lessons, recording, 
renting of venue 
Kowloon East, Ngau 
Tau Kok, Kwun Tong 
industrial area 
(before: Kowloon 
West, Kwai Chung 
industrial area) 
n/a max.  
200 ppl.  
Backstage 
Live 
Restaurant   
(since 2007)  
“restaurant”: food & 
beverage, liquor 
Hong Kong Island, 
Central  
registered 
business (liquor 
license) 
max.      
180 ppl.  
Music Zone @ 
E-Max KITEC 
(since 2007) 
“livehouse”: renting of 
concert facilities, 
beverage, merchandise 
Kowloon East, 
Kowloon Bay 
investment 
company of 
Hopewell 
Holdings Ltd. 
max.    
600 ppl. 
Grappa’s 
Cellar    
(since 2005) 
“restaurant”: food & 
beverage, liquor, renting 
of venue facilities 
Hong Kong Island, 
Central 
registered 
business (liquor 
license) 
max.     
400 ppl. 
Hang Out at 
Youth 
Outreach 
(since 2002) 
“youth center” (indoor 
basketball court): renting 
of space, donations 
Hong Kong Island 
(NE), Sai Wan Ho  
registered 
charitable NPO 
max.   
350 ppl.  
Warehouse 
Teenage Club 
(since 1991) 
“youth center” (music 
venue): renting of space, 
donations, tickets 
Hong Kong Island 
(SW), Aberdeen 
registered 
charitable NPO 
(Wofoo Social 
Enterprise) 
max.    
150 ppl. 
The Wanch 
(since 1987) 
“bar”: liquor, food & 
beverage 
Hong Kong Island, 
Wan Chai 
registered 
business (liquor 
license) 
max.   
100 ppl. 
Fringe Club 
(since 1984) 
“public art space”: self-
funded (tickets); lease 
for nominal rent 
Hong Kong Island, 
Central 
non-profit arts 
organization 
max.    
120 ppl. 
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Nevertheless, all of these industrial locations were initiated by local individuals that 
have been personally invested in Hong Kong’s local music scene. In contrast, the 
livehouse venues on Hong Kong Island—e.g. XXX (“Triple X”), Beating Heart, The 
Wanch—were founded by affluent expatriates who are—arguably—very exemplary 
representatives of Florida’s creative class. While most of them are in senior 
management positions, they have established their own livehouse not out of 
entrepreneurial esteem, but what they perceived as shortcomings in Hong Kong’s 
cultural offering (Interview: Beating Heart, 2014; Strategic Sound, 2014). As 
registered businesses they mainly generate their income from food and beverage sales 
to cover the high operational costs in these districts. Therefore their engagement with 
entertainment is often guided by economic considerations to target their program to a 
broader audience. Located in the densely populated CBD with many mixed residential 
and commercial blocks, these venues have also been subjected to very rigorous law 
enforcement practices regarding liquor sales and noise nuisance. 
3.2.3  “Room for Maneuvers” within Non-Cultural Policies 
 Nevertheless, both commercial and industrial livehouse venues have learnt to 
manage and manipulate the boundaries within they are able to operate. Drawing upon 
the case of Hidden Agenda, this section analyzes the non-cultural regulations as well 
as the tactical maneuvers in response to them—including aspects of land use, liquor 
licensing, entertainment licensing and noise control.   
 
Land Use 
 Any town planning project in Hong Kong is strictly determined by the publicly 
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accessible Outline Zoning Plan (OZP) that compartmentalizes land according to its 
intended purpose. The most common zones are “residential”, “commercial”, and 
“other specified uses (business)” (abbreviated as OU(B)).60 Currently, the permitted 
uses of industrial buildings located in OU(B) excludes places of public entertainment 
or restaurants/bars, under which a livehouse could be potentially legalized.61 In order 
to circumvent this definition, Hidden Agenda asked each guest to sign up for 
membership that was valid for one year and stated clearly that “the premises where 
Hidden Agenda is located is private and no admittance is allowed unless with this 
card”. If authorities would have controlled a breach of land use during a show, the 
livehouse could have argued that only members of a private club are present. By using 
this tactic, Hidden Agenda usually increases the bureaucratic workload for relevant 
authorities to prove the non-compliant nature of the venue. If a space is suspected to 
violate the current land use regulations, the Lands Department might start an 
investigation of which the last consequence could be a dispossession of the current 
landlord. Although the government usually restrains from this step, it remains a 
potential threat that is sometimes brought up during negotiations (Interview: Chow, 
2013).   
 
Liquor License 
 Any establishment in Hong Kong—whether bar, restaurant or club—that intends 
                                                 
60 Other common categories are government/ institution/ community, green belt and open space. Land 
development projects of the Urban Renewal Authority, such as the Kwun Tong Town Centre, are outlined as a 
separate zoning category.  
61 The only exception is made if industrial buildings have already a non-industrial section in the lower ground 
floors that are physically separated from any spaces for industrial use. The majority of industrial buildings in 
Kwun Tong, however, do not fall within this category, as their ground floor is usually reserved for the loading and 
parking of trucks. 
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to sell alcoholic beverages needs to apply for a liquor license from the Liquor 
Licensing Board (LLB) under the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department 
(FEHD).62 The future licensee is also required to place advertisements in newspapers 
to seek public opinion from nearby residents who can voice out their concerns during 
the application process and the final public hearing. Based on objections that are 
brought up during that time, the LLB can define additional conditions for the licensee 
such as fixed time frames when it is not allowed to play music or sell alcohol (e.g. 
from 11pm to 8am). However, in several occasions the board has also been accused of 
being inconsistent with these conditions.63 Violations of liquor licensing laws are 
considered a serious offense in Hong Kong and also put the venue at risk to criminalize 
its guests.  
 In its first and second location, Hidden Agenda sold alcoholic beverages to visitors 
without having obtained a liquor license. Since then, as a repeat offender, the venue 
has been blacklisted from any future applications to the LLB. Currently, in order to 
circumvent the regulation, Hidden Agenda gives out beer for free and invites guests to 
donate an unclarified amount of money. In addition, it is tolerated that people bring 
their own drinks to the concerts. Although lawyers suggested that the livehouse could 
also sublet several square meters and outsource liquor sales, Hidden Agenda decided 
not to provoke the concerned authorities any further. For the founders of Hidden 
Agenda, the consumption of liquor during concerts is an inextricable part of livehouse 
                                                 
62 All applications made to the board are at the same time referred to the Police Commissioner and District 
Officer for further comments. 
63 When a bar in Central filed for a judicial review on grounds of unreasonableness, Mr Justice Kevin Zervos 
ruled that the conditions of the LLB were in fact unreasonable (Sabinano II Marcel R v. Municipal Services 
Appeal Board (2014), see: http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/2014/382.html) 
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culture and therefore carries not only substantial economic, but also cultural value that 
contributes to the authenticity and credibility of the place. However, this opinion is not 
necessarily shared across the entire local music scene. For members of Musician 
AREA, for instance, the focus on liquor consumption in music bars on Hong Kong 
Island was one of the reasons to create an independent space on the Kowloon side 
where music can be put again in the foreground.  
 
Public Entertainment License  
 In 2011, the Lands Department informed the FEHD about the case of Hidden 
Agenda and the livehouse was requested to apply for a temporary “place of public 
entertainment license” to overcome its illegal status.64 In a first reaction, however, the 
representatives of Hidden Agenda argued that they organize cultural events instead of 
entertainment shows and refused to follow the order. The official definition of the term, 
as it appears in the Places of Public Entertainment Ordinance (Cap. 172)—enacted in 
1919—is indeed quite broad:  
 “[A] concert, opera, ballet, stage performance or other 
musical, dramatic or theatrical entertainment; a 
cinematograph or laser projection  display; a circus; 
lecture or story-telling; an exhibition (…) of pictures, 
 photographs, books, manuscripts or other documents or 
other things; a sporting exhibition or contest; a bazaar; an 
amusement ride (…); dance party.”65 
 
 Overall “public entertainment” refers to any entertainment “to which the general 
                                                 
64 There are two kinds of Public Entertainment Licenses in Hong Kong, one particularly for cinemas and 
theatres, and another one for “any other kind of entertainment”. The “Place of Public Entertainment License” 
under the FEHD should not be confused with the general “Entertainment License” issued by the Home Affairs 
Department (Office of Licensing Authority). The latter only refers to operations of amusement centers, mahjong 
parlors, lotteries, tombola, trade promotions (e.g. lucky draw) and public dance halls. 
65 The last amendments of this definition were made in 2002.  
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public is admitted with or without payment”. Currently there are only 138 permanent 
entertainment licensees registered in the FEHD database.66 At the same time, the 
Lands Department treats the license as a proof that there is no violation of the land use 
and that the premise has met all safety regulations to which “places of (public) 
entertainment” are automatically subjected to. Compared to Mainland China, where 
also the type of performance has to be approved by the relevant authority for its 
lawfulness, the HKSAR government does usually not impose any regulations on the 
content of cultural events (Xu, 2013; Zuser, 2011).67  
 
Noise Control  
In Hong Kong the exposure to noise in private and public spaces is regulated by 
the Noise Control Ordinance along both objective and subjective criteria: “noise 
emission standards” (in decibels) and “annoyance”. In urban areas (including most of 
industrial, commercial and residential areas) the acceptable noise levels must remain 
below 65-70dB(A) during the day (7am to 11pm) and 55-60dB(A) at night time (11pm 
to 7am).68 These regulations are also considered to have hampered Hong Kong’s 
potential to become a popular entertainment hub in Asia. Several attempts during the 
last decade to establish the Hong Kong Stadium near Happy Valley as an outdoor 
                                                 
66 The majority of licensees are indoor playgrounds such as Jumpin’ Gym USA. 
67 Nevertheless, all foreign artists that are remunerated for a performance in Hong Kong are required to apply for 
a working visa from the Immigration Department beforehand.  
68 dB(A) – Decibel is a unit to measure and evaluate noise levels. A-weighted decibels “dB(A)” indicate that the 
value takes the sensitivity of the human ear into account. The range between 60 and 70db(A) is equivalent to 
average road traffic noise in a distance of 25 meters, 80db(A) to railway noise in a distance of 25 meters. Various 
sources that emit similar noise levels at the same time will lead to a slight increase of the overall noise level. The 
risk for hearing impairment increases disproportionately. For every three additional decibels, the recommended 
time of exposure decreases by 50%. For more information see the platform of the Environmental Protection 
Department for Noise Education: http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/noise_education/web/ENG_EPD_ 
HTML/index/index.html     
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venue for pop music concerts failed due to on-going complaints by residents that 
required organizers to stay within the allowed limit of 70dB(A) (SCMP, 2007).69 One 
of the last entertainment events was a government-backed health rally in 1994 that 
featured performances by local Canto-Pop stars, but also proved the infeasibility of 
outdoor shows in this stadium: 
  “Organisers tried to keep the amplified noise level to 
the legal limit by encouraging the audience to cheer by 
waving or clapping with white gloves provided at the venue. 
However, only about half the crowd were reported to have 
worn the gloves and the 70 decibels legal noise limit was 
occasionally broken by cheering.”  (SCMP, 1994) 
 
 Currently, the noise control in the city is monitored and administered by the 
Environmental Protection Department. While a certain noise level can be measured 
objectively, other sounds that might be even significantly below the legal limits, can 
nevertheless be deemed an “annoyance”.70        
 As noise usually has a direct impact on people’s living quality, the enforcement of 
the law in residential and mixed areas in Hong Kong is taken very seriously and has 
become one of the main concerns for bars and music venues. Given the nature of the 
industrial area in Kwun Tong and the lack of nearby residents, noise levels have never 
been a serious issue for Hidden Agenda. When Musician AREA operated its previous 
industrial space in Kwai Chung, another tenant filed a complaint and the venue was 
prosecuted for noise nuisance. However, the court eventually ruled that it is reasonable 
                                                 
69 Another single charity event for orphans in May 2003 after the SARS epidemic stirred up discussions when 
five residents filed noise complaints despite having knowledge of the charitable cause (SCMP, 2003). The last 
attempt for a pop concert in 2007 pleased the surrounding neighborhood, but was not well received by the 
audience that criticized the poor sound quality (SCMP, 2007). 
70 The Environmental Protection Department defines noise as follows: “Noise is unwanted sound. Usually the 
sound of a violin is referred to as music [and] is something pleasing. Depending on other factors, the sound may 
be perceived as noise.” (See: http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/noise_education/web/ENG_EPD_HTML/ 
m1/intro_1.html) 
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to assume certain noise levels in factory buildings (Interview: Musician AREA, 2014).  
3.2.4 Friend or Foe: Energizing Kowloon East Office 
 Although Hidden Agenda and other activist groups criticized the revitalization 
measurements for their negative impact on Hong Kong’s cultural development, their 
campaigns had relatively little impact on policy level. Similarly, the subsequent survey 
by the ADC—that had underlined the significance of industrial buildings—did not 
bring any changes in existing regulations. However, in recent years the Development 
Bureau became increasingly aware of the dimensions of non-compliant users, whose 
concerns were brought up in meetings of the Town Planning Board and district 
councils.  
 In the case of Kwun Tong, the government decided to implement a new 
redevelopment approach that—given its scale—was unprecedented in Hong Kong. By 
establishing a physical presence through the Energizing Kowloon East Office (EKEO), 
the Development Bureau put urban planners and the users of industrial buildings in 
striking distance to each other. While this proximity facilitated more opportunities for 
direct communication, it also increased tensions between different interest groups. 
This section will therefore analyze the role of the EKEO in the transformation process 
of Kwun Tong and its engagement with spaces such as Hidden Agenda, culminating 
in a comparison of two discursive strands.    
 In 2011, then Chief Executive Donald Tsang announced the plan for the 
“Development of Kowloon East”, the biggest urban renewal project that has ever been 
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undertaken in Hong Kong.71 In contrast to Kai Tak, where the government will invest 
up to HK$ 100 billion over the next years, the industrial area of Kwun Tong is 
supposed to transform “organically” without significant public investment, simply by 
attracting developers from the private sector. Therefore, the main purpose of the EKEO, 
which was set up on the former site of Kwun Tong’s paper recycling station72 in 2012, 
is:  
  “…to steer, supervise, oversee and monitor the 
development of Kowloon East with a view to facilitating its 
transformation into another premier CBD of Hong Kong to 
support our economic growth and strengthen our global 
competitiveness.”73 
            
 Overall, Hong Kong’s urban renewal strategy consists of three different 
approaches: redevelopment, rehabilitation and revitalization (Development Bureau, 
2011). The strategy of revitalization, as held up by the EKEO, is seen as a “soft” 
process that will “enhance vibrancy of degenerated localities without massive 
destruction of the original built environment” (Development Bureau, 2007). However, 
this approach must be seen in stark contrast to the Urban Renewal Authority (URA) 
that implements redevelopment and rehabilitation projects by direct intervention.74 
The URA especially targets “old, dilapidated buildings with poor living conditions”, 
where intervention is deemed necessary and beneficial for the community. While this 
                                                 
71 In total, the redevelopment area covers 488 hectares across Kai Tak (320 hectares), Kowloon Bay (91 hectares) 
and Kwun Tong (77 hectares).  
72 The closure of Kwun Tong’s Public Cargo Working Area (PCWA) in 2011 was discussed controversially, 
especially regarding its significance for employment and waste management.  
73 See: http://www.ekeo.gov.hk/en/about_ekeo/ekeo.html 
74 Rehabilitation refers to the prolongation of the building’s lifespan by encouraging, supporting and 
implementing timely renovation and maintenance. This is similar to the concept of preservation, when sites of 
historical, social and cultural significance are concerned. In contrast, redevelopment—as defined by the 
Development Bureau—is a more far-reaching process that targets dilapidated buildings with the intention to re-
plan and re-build entire urban areas for an overall alleviation of living standards. 
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top-down approach of the URA can often accelerate the development process, it is 
usually proceeded by longsome negotiations over compensating and displacing former 
owners and tenants. 
 The EKEO in Kwun Tong is headed by town planner Raymond Lee and 
government architect Winnie Ho, who directly report to the Development Bureau. 
Since its establishment in 2012, the office has published three updated versions of a 
conceptual master plan and organized several conferences to engage with academics, 
experts and the community. Compared to previous redevelopment projects by the 
Development Bureau and the URA, the EKEO decided to use a place-making approach 
(see Ch. 2.1.2), which still has an experimental character in Hong Kong: 
  “We didn’t know our approach, when we set up the 
office. … Actually, even within the government, there are a 
lot of question marks, [such as] whether we should set targets 
[for office space supply]. But in an old district, we gradually 
understand that hard targets may not be the best way.”75 
        (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
 
 The EKEO sees place-making both as process and philosophy to “capitalize on a 
local community’s assets, inspiration, and potential”, and to energize the hard- and 
software of Kwun Tong’s industrial area. 76  The office itself, however, is only a 
temporary construction and will be removed once the transformation is under way—
ideally before 2020. In terms of hardware, the EKEO is responsible for refurbishing 
government land and providing a clean and tidy environment to attract future 
                                                 
75 Currently, the office supply potential of Kowloon East is estimated at a gross floor area of 4 million sqm, of 
which 2.9 million are located in Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong. 2.7 million sqm are needed to meet Hong Kong’s 
future demand of Grade A offices until 2030. (See: http://www.greening.gov.hk/tc/people_tree_harmony/doc/ 
glo_seminar_ 20130807_combined_(compressed).pdf) 
76 This wording was directly taken from the website of the “Project for Public Spaces” (PPS). Founded in 1975 
in the USA, this organisation is considered to be the pioneer for place-making in contemporary urban planning.  
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developers. As one of its first acts, the office suggested to promulgate the future CBD 
identity of Kwun Tong by replacing all road signs that read “industrial area” with 
“business area”.  
Fearing a faster valorization of property values, the new signage was fiercely opposed 
by some artists nearby. Subsequently, one sign was retouched with graffiti, crossing 
out the word “business” and replacing it with “arts” (see Image 4 above). Since then, 
the EKEO especially focused on the redesign of open space near the waterfront 
promenade, which was already opened in 2010 and is managed by the LCSD. In 2013, 
the office opened a public space next to the promenade, right beneath the flyover of 
the Kwun Tong Bypass highway. This new outdoor venue, called “Fly the Flyover01” 
(indicating that similar spaces will follow), is generally regarded as a test-bed for 
utilizing redundant spatial resources in the city. 77  While the EKEO has been 
promoting the space as an informal cultural venue for the general public, where events 
                                                 
77 Since then, lawmakers suggested to use flyovers also for markets, arts centers, rehearsal studios, recycling 
depots, offices and temporary housing. (See: http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?we_cat=4&art_id 
=131051&sid=38981219&con_type=1&d_str=20130215&fc=8) 
Image 4: Graffiti claiming "Kwun Tong Art Area" after road signs were 
changed from "industrial" to "business" in 2012 (Source: Facebook) 
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could be held for free and without any formal approval, the flyover was received 
skeptically by the music community in Kwun Tong. Artists complaint that the “fuss” 
around the new venue actually distracted from the problems for cultural spaces, which 
have become more serious since the EKEO started to actively promote the commercial 
transition (Interviews, 2013; 2014). In addition, the independent music scene has used 
similar spaces around Kwun Tong Ferry Pier as early as 2005 for a so called “guerilla 
gig” series, which usually took place at night without any prior application to the police 
department. By refurbishing the flyover, this space of resistance was quasi re-
appropriated by the government. Nevertheless, the EKEO tries to enforce only a 
minimum set of regulations:  
  “I think you can feel the difference. [Hong Kong] is 
usually quite an over-managed place. So we tell our guards: 
Forget about what you did in your previous job. Here you 
only need to watch for safety.” (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
 
However, the unapproved appearance of graffiti also caused some internal 
disagreements:  
  “That time, actually, we struggle a bit. The graffiti is 
not that bad and it is difficult to judge between art work and 
graffiti. But it is a bit scary and so we decided to remove it. 
Now our rule is: Okay, you can do graffiti, if you inform us. 
Then we can allocate a space for you.” 
          (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
Although the office also tried to encourage musicians from Kwun Tong to use the 
flyover space, Hidden Agenda called for a boycott, which has since then been held up 
by many bands and music promoters in Hong Kong. Instead, the space is most 
frequently used by photographers, skaters, cyclists and smaller community 
organizations.  
 While currently the flyover is still supervised by the EKEO, it is planned to 
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outsource the management to cultural NGOs in the future. By the end of 2013 the 
office started a market sounding exercise to analyze the interest and capabilities of 
potential candidates as well as the necessary conditions for a leasing agreement. The 
flyover space has become the main project to integrate “creativity, arts and culture” 
into the revitalization of Kwun Tong which is recognized as “an ’incubator’ for artists 
and creative industries”:    
  “In line with Government’s commitment to find 
opportunities to provide suitable spaces for artists, art groups 
and creative designers in Kowloon East, Energizing 
Kowloon East Office aims to utilize the unused spaces under 
the Kwun Tong Bypass for creativity, arts and cultural use 
and turn them into contemporary cultural hub [sic!] in Kwun 
Tong for all to enjoy and contributing to enriching the lives 
of Hong Kong people.”    (EKEO, 2013c: 8) 
  
Other future projects of the EKEO in the domain of creativity and culture include the 
intended transformation of the playground in Tsun Yip Street into an Industrial 
Heritage Park as well as a proposal bidding for “Kai Tak Fantasy”, a future leisure and 
entertainment hub at the site of the former airport. However, the emergence of this 
cultural agenda rather increased than resolved the tension between nearby artists and 
the EKEO. A counter-campaign of different cultural users in Kwun Tong accused the 
office of “exterminating” Kowloon East with its “energizing” approach (see Image 5 
on p. 84).78 Nevertheless, there has still been a direct exchange between Hidden 
Agenda and the EKEO to discuss potential solutions for the current struggles of the 
livehouse. 
                                                 
78 This campaign also called for the submission of photos to EKEO, together with a stamp that reads “dead due 
to energization” (Chinese: 因起动而死亡).  
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To overcome the on-going distrust, some of the meetings also involved external 
mediators.79 Although there is some basic sympathy for the difficulties which artists 
currently face, the EKEO sees the cultural sector only as a marginal interest group 
among many others. In addition, given its priority for a place-making approach, the 
influence and responsibility of the office are limited to the visible space and do not 
extend to the inner life of industrial buildings. Nevertheless, the EKEO seems fully 
aware that its organizational structure on bureau-level could certainly help to facilitate 
better communication with other policy bureaus regarding the situation of artists in 
Kwun Tong:    
  “I think the good thing is [that] this office is … part of 
the Development Bureau, so it’s easy for us to work with 
other bureaus. We know that the bands and some other artists 
are not happy.”    (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
 
 
In the case of Hidden Agenda, the EKEO believes that it would be possible to come to 
an agreement with the Lands Department—which operates under the Development 
Bureau—to tolerate such a livehouse within existing land use regulations. However, 
                                                 
79 e.g. Ada Wong, founder of the Hong Kong Institute of Contemporary Culture and Make A Difference (MaD) 
Image 5: Exterminating instead of Energizing: the original EKEO 
logo (above) was mocked in a counter-campaign by artists (below) 
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the bottom line is set by the Fire Services Department (under the Security Bureau) that 
will not authorize a public venue inside a still functioning industrial building due to 
safety concerns:  
  “Because these are the things that cannot fit into the 
industrial buildings. Not that they cause noise or anything to 
the existing tenant, it’s the danger of the existing uses that 
will affect the customers. So the line is: If they use it as their 
own studio ... they know the place very well. It’s already a 
lot of work to make the fire department move the line up to 
this point. We tried to push further …, but they said, it’s the 
life of the people and the life of their firemen. … It really 
cannot go further. 
        (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
 
This argument is usually countered by foregrounding the general risk for all users in 
industrial buildings—especially factory workers—which should require all owners of 
such premises to take necessary precautions (Interview: Chow, 2013). 
 With regards to the cultural value of these spaces, the EKEO also decided to seek 
policy advice from the Home Affairs Bureau (HAB), which currently oversees Hong 
Kong’s official cultural policy, as well as CreateHK (under the Commerce and 
Economic Development Bureau), which promotes creative industries. However, 
neither of them identified any ground for getting involved. While HAB defines its 
responsibility primarily in the funding of “high art”, CreateHK is mainly interested in 
the future “Kai Tak Fantasy” project (Interview: EKEO, 2013). 
 In summary, the EKEO understands itself only as facilitator for the organic 
transformation of Kwun Tong. However, by adopting the concept of place-making for 
a primarily aesthetic change of an area that is “not particularly pleasing visually”,80 
                                                 
80 See: http://www.ekeo.gov.hk/en/about_ekeo/background.html 
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its actual possibilities to intervene when the redevelopment entails material 
disadvantages for some interest groups are in fact very limited. The justification for 
this non-interventional approach is usually explained with reference to Hong Kong’s 
steadfast economic values: 
  “If [private developers] choose to refurbish a building 
that is just a quick sell off for cash flow, we still respect them. 
That’s Hong Kong. That’s another important value that we 
should treasure. Freedom to decide what you want to do with 
your money, your property, your wealth. But on the other 
hand, we promote … good practice [and] good heart. [T]hey 
can choose to have that good heart or not. It’s up to them.” 
       (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
 
Although based on different reasoning, many artists also derive their rights for cultural 
space from the free market economy, as they understand the top-down revitalization 
measurements as an unfair manipulation that has favored real-estate conglomerates 
(Interviews: Chow, 2013; Hidden Agenda, 2013; Strategic Sound, 2014).  
 One of the keywords in this dispute is the term “under-utilized” that has been used 
by the government continuously in relation to industrial buildings, indicating that the 
current use of land has not tapped the full potential.81 For the Development Bureau, 
the best utilization for Kwun Tong’s industrial area is the provision of Grade A office 
space that should help fostering the values and aesthetics of Hong Kong’s second CBD. 
For many cultural users, on the other hand, relatively low vacancy rates reflect that the 
current spatial resources are not only fully utilized, but that there is a high demand for 
them across many sectors, which might all be displaced in the near future (see Table 4 
on p. 87 for a comparison of discourses between cultural users and the Energizing  
                                                 
81 Compared to the verb “to use”, “to utilize” can be considered a judgmental term that narrows down the use 
“for a particular purpose”. (See: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utilize) 
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Kowloon East Office that were touched upon in this section).  
 Meanwhile, gentrification of the industrial area has already started and the 
redevelopment is seen widely as “inevitable”, but even though the domain of “culture, 
arts and creativity” has become part of the place-making process, the majority of the 
creative community does not want to contribute to the transformation that will 
eventually cause its own displacement.  
Table 4: Comparison of discourses between cultural users and EKEO in relation to 
Kwun Tong’s redevelopment (own table) 
  
The following section will therefore look at the different aspects of Kwun Tong’s 
sustainability as an organically evolved cluster outside Hong Kong’s cultural policy 
strategies. 
 Cultural users EKEO (Development Bureau) 
Vision  Organic cultural cluster (for 
social and cultural purpose), 
representing (sub)cultural values 
Central Business District (for 
economic purpose), representing 
“Central District Values” 
Objectives Return to previous land status 
(industrial zone, no revitalization 
policies); fully legalize cultural 
use of industrial buildings 
Facilitate development in 
accordance with the business zone; 
encourage conversion of industrial 
buildings into office space 
Rights   Choice and development based on 
free-market economy 
(revitalization policies are seen as 
unfair intervention)  
Choice and development based on 
free-market economy (integration 
of cultural use cannot be forced 
upon private developers) 
Utilization  Artists fully utilize land resources 
(argument sometimes backed by 
statistics of low vacancy rates in 
Kwun Tong) 
Industrial land resources are not 
fully utilized (land value lower than 
other areas; sometimes backed by 
statistics of comparably high 
vacancy rates in Kwun Tong) 
Perception  “Extermination” (the current 
revitalization plan will 
exterminate the dynamics of the 
cultural clusters) 
“Revitalization” (the area needs to 
become aesthetically and culturally 
more attractive to facilitate its 
transformation) 
Cooperation  EKEO’s place-making approach 
aims to instrumentalize culture 
for its own purpose 
Place-making approach should 
increase vibrancy and interaction 
with local communities 
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3.3 Just another Fo Tan?  
The cultural cluster in Kwun Tong cannot be analyzed in isolation from other 
organically evolved art districts in the city. Given its rising profile as a visual arts area, 
Fo Tan has become a “significant other” to further define and recognize Kwun Tong’s 
particularity. In the following part, the given context and previous analyses will be 
translated into a discussion of sustainability, by juxtaposing the specificity of music-
related cultural space in Kwun Tong with the prevailing art studios in Fo Tan, using 
Lily Kong’s (2012) recent study as a reference. According to Kong (2012), the overall 
sustainability of a cluster is constituted by three sub-categories: economic, social, and 
cultural sustainability. However, drawing from the peculiar case study laid out above, 
this research argues for an extension of this model by introducing governmental 
sustainability as a fourth category that determines the viability of organically evolved 
clusters in Hong Kong.  
3.3.1 Cultural Sustainability  
The cultural sustainability of Fo Tan is mainly tied to its industrial environment 
that is beneficial for producing any kind of visual art. In fact, appropriate physical 
space is “a very fundamental condition for sustaining certain types of artistic work” 
(Kong, 2012: 186). The high ceilings, concrete floors and spacious units that can 
hardly be found anywhere else than in those flatted factories are therefore one of the 
most important arguments for painters, artisans or sculptors to buy or rent their studios 
in this area. Meanwhile, the proximity to existing factories in Fo Tan offers not only 
convenient access to both materials and specialized craftsmanship (e.g. woodwork), 
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but also a certain industrial “grittiness” that is often perceived as authentic and 
inspirational (Kong, 2012: 186-187).  
A creative space such as Hidden Agenda certainly draws upon similar resources 
in Kwun Tong. However, although live music venues as well as rehearsal rooms can 
also be found in other parts of Hong Kong and the feasibility is not only bound to the 
specific physical characteristics of industrial buildings, their cultural sustainability 
must be somewhat derived from the peculiar spatial practices that are facilitated by 
existing zoning regulations.  
3.3.2 Social Sustainability  
With regard to social sustainability, most of the artists in Fo Tan agree that its 
proximity to the Fine Arts Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong 
(CUHK) in Sha Tin has played a significant role for the area’s social dynamics. While 
this influence might not be as dominant as it was previously, 82  the geographical 
location encourages ongoing ties between the institution and the local arts community. 
At the same time, the cluster has also fostered interaction between different users (both 
industrial and creative) and a broader public, especially through local galleries and the 
annual Fotanian festival. However, as most of the artists prefer to work individually in 
their own studios, some people also seem to miss a permanent and user-friendly 
common space such as a café or canteen that could increase the connectedness within 
the community (Kong, 2012: 187-191). Nevertheless, by referring to Benedict 
                                                 
82 During the first years, the majority of the artists in Fo Tan was affiliated with the Chinese University and 
consisted of students, graduates, and faculty staff. Later, however, more institutions started to offer their own arts 
programs, which diversified the composition of the cluster (Interview: Chow, 2013). 
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Anderson’s (1991) concept of an “imagined community”, Kong (2012: 190) suggests 
that the mere knowledge of having like-minded people around remains one of the most 
important factors for motivation and inspiration of artists in Fo Tan.  
In contrast to the individualistic art studios, the rehearsal spaces in Kwun Tong 
are usually collectively organized. Several bands often rent and share the same unit, 
which also increases the creative productivity by allowing spontaneous improvisation 
and collaboration between different people and across different music genres. 
Although this happens behind closed doors, Hidden Agenda initially offered the 
common space where these bands could perform their artistic work in front of a live 
audience and simultaneously engage with the music of others. While such a space 
might be missed in Fo Tan, the artists there have already established the Fotanian 
festival, which has turned the arts cluster into a widely recognized brand. Arguably, 
spaces such as Hidden Agenda serve a similar function for Kwun Tong by connecting 
it with a community beyond the district, especially by inviting internationally 
respected bands and seeking cooperation with reputable organizations such as 
consulates or cultural institutes.   
Other than Fo Tan, Kwun Tong is not located nearby any tertiary institutions, 
which also means that the social production of its arts cluster needs to be derived from 
other geographical aspects. Kwun Tong is not only one of the most densely populated 
districts of Hong Kong, but also one of the areas with the highest ratio of public 
housing. Nevertheless, according to the ADC (2010) survey it accommodates the 
largest share of Hong Kong’s creative spaces in industrial buildings.  
Although the survey findings do not offer a district-specific breakdown of income 
and educational background, the high proportion of bachelor and postgraduate degrees 
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among visual artists in Fo Tan certainly implies a clustering of people with a relatively 
high social, economic, and cultural capital. Therefore, the site-specific emergence of a 
music cluster in Kwun Tong, in which the costs for rent are often shared by several 
people and credibility is not significantly linked to academic qualification, should be 
seen likewise as a result of the socio-economic context of the nearby residential areas 
and their influence on distinct spatial practices that have apparently identified music 
as a preferred art form (Interviews: Chow, 2013; Hidden Agenda, 2013; Farooqi, 2014; 
Strategic Sound; 2014; Musician AREA, 2014).  
3.3.3 Economic Sustainability 
The third and final aspect of Kong’s (2012) analysis is concerned with the 
economic sustainability and mainly refers to how cultural clusters respond to a 
potential commercial development. In the case of Fo Tan, although it fulfills the most 
common prerequisites for commercialization, the actual effects on the popularity and 
affordability of spaces have remained rather low, even after the years following the 
revitalization measurements for industrial buildings. 
In contrast, the relative proximity of Kwun Tong to the current CBD on Hong 
Kong Island and large-scale real estate projects such as the development of Kai Tak 
accelerated the valorization of industrial premises and will eventually threaten the 
economic viability of the creative (and industrial) spaces. However, even if the 
question of funding and proper legalization of the venue could be solved, once the 
development is under way, the increasing commercial and residential gentrification of 
the surrounding neighborhoods would simultaneously affect other aspects of 
sustainability and a forced closure or displacement could therefore be inevitable. 
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3.3.4 Governmental Sustainability  
 Arguably, the sustainability of a space such as Hidden Agenda cannot be fully 
captured by the cultural, economic and social aspects mentioned above. In order to fill 
this void, this research suggests two further dimensions of governmental sustainability.  
The first one is determined by the actual spatial practices that have been shaped 
by governmental power. On the one hand, the operation in disguise is a result of zoning 
laws that—theoretically—render many of the city’s post-industrial activities and 
business operations illegal. On the other hand, the growth of cultural clusters (and an 
allegedly low vacancy rate of industrial areas in general) has been based on a shared 
understanding of utilization. Different authorities have been tolerating non-compliant 
uses, as they also helped to countervail the rapid decline and redundancy of industrial 
buildings, while securing income for landlords. The elasticity of the legal framework 
has been confined by a set of commonly known bottom lines—mainly related to issues 
of health (hygiene, liquor) and safety. As a result, Kwun Tong and Fo Tan largely 
remained within the domain of production and manufacture. They maintained the 
“residual practices” of an industrial base while engaging with the “emerging practices” 
of non-industrial users. At the same time, given the barriers for places of consumption 
that would most likely attract more affluent users, classic gentrification processes have 
not been a great concern for organically evolved cultural clusters in Hong Kong, 
especially compared to often cited examples from Europe (e.g. Prenzlauer Berg, Berlin) 
and the USA (e.g. Brooklyn, New York). Instead, the industrial areas have been 
restrained from creating their own inherent valorization cycles that otherwise could 
have been stimulated by their potential for cultural and creative appropriation of space. 
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Nevertheless, this process was eventually imposed by the revitalization measurements 
in 2009 that added a value-based judgment to the term “utilization”, indicating that the 
“best” and most preferable use requires a fast integration into Hong Kong’s 
commercial property market. As previously mentioned, Ng (2009) argues that urban 
space in Hong Kong is both “ideologized and political”. Although avoiding any 
reference to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, she further argues that the 
production of space is not only an externally directed imposition of state ideologies, 
but at the same time shaped and altered by individuals that either re-enforce the 
material inscriptions of dominant ideologies or try to challenge them. Currently, the 
main difference between Kwun Tong and Fo Tan is their position within Hong Kong’s 
urban renewal strategy. While Fo Tan is still listed as an industrial area, Kwun Tong 
has already been rezoned for business purposes in 2001, allowing more commercial 
spaces to settle down. Nevertheless, cultural spaces such as art studios, live venues or 
galleries are still restricted in both districts. While the production of visual art is of 
rather introverted nature and does not affect its immediate neighbors, Hidden Agenda 
and spaces nearby very much depend on the indifference and tolerance by other tenants. 
However, given the lack of (legal) residents, noise levels are currently less problematic. 
In addition, streets and premises are less monitored within industrial areas, which also 
adds to the production of a subcultural imagination.     
 The second domain of governmental sustainability in relation to organically 
evolved clusters such as Kwun Tong is related to civic power. Following Bennett’s 
interpretation of De Certeau, the use of spatial tactics implies an exclusion from a 
power/knowledge relationship and a temporary escape from a panoptic power. But it 
is here where the social and cultural differences between Fo Tan and Kwun Tong 
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become most apparent. While many of the visual artists in Fo Tan have purchased their 
own units, musicians in Kwun Tong mainly rent their spaces, which already puts them 
in a considerably weaker position within redevelopment debates. Hidden Agenda was 
one of the first successful attempts to claim a space within a power/knowledge 
relationship by transgressing the previous border of passive resistance (de Certeau), 
calling for social action (Lefebvre) and becoming a professional livehouse.  
 Arguably, Hong Kong’s industrial areas have flourished as places for non-
compliant use, because the physical, social and economic environment has not 
reflected the necessity for a capitalist-aesthetic order nor established a similar 
surveillance system as in purely residential and commercial districts. However, the 
introduction of measurements to revitalize industrial buildings, with favorable policies 
for real estate corporations, can be understood as an intervention to enable a fast and 
large-scale gentrification process through which Kwun Tong will also undergo a major 
ideological and governmental shift in the years to come.  
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4 CULTURAL POLICY AND URBAN PLANNING  
“Some of the underground groups they try to escape 
from everyone. They think they can just hide and do their 
own thing. Of course they are not asking for funding or 
any help from the government. But if they are still hiding, 
it is not easy to show the real truth to the government what 
we [the artists] have been doing for years.” 
   (Interview: Chow, 2013) 
 
 
 The previous chapter shed light on the transformation of Kwun Tong’s industrial 
area in the face of imminent redevelopment. By using the livehouse Hidden Agenda 
as a case study, the analysis of spatial practices, relevant policies and discourses not 
only revealed contradictions between urban planning objectives and arts spaces in a 
distinct local setting, but also a more far-reaching detachment of grassroots culture 
from expedient creativity discourses as outlined in the conceptual framework (Chapter 
2.2). The fourth chapter will therefore shift its level of investigation from the specific 
case of Hidden Agenda and Kwun Tong to the macro-perspective of Hong Kong’s 
cultural policy strategies in order to understand the relationship between urban 
planning and cultural clusters in the city.  
 The chapter is divided into three parts: The first section discusses the context for 
the changes of Hong Kong’s urban planning strategies and their impact on the 
emergence of planned cultural clusters, which will be analyzed along their positioning, 
zoning and management. Drawing upon the findings from the case study, these clusters 
are then related to Hidden Agenda and the industrial area of Kwun Tong. It is through 
this juxtaposition that the thesis aims to foreground the struggle over spatial power as 
well as the significance of tactics and strategies used for the cultural appropriation of 
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space. Eventually, the last part of this chapter elevates the discussion to the domain of 
cultural governance by exposing Hong Kong’s dispersed “culture portfolio” and giving 
recommendations for a change in policy responsibilities.  
4.1 Cultural Clusters: Strategies, Planning, Policies 
 Until now, this thesis has mainly dealt with Kwun Tong as a so called organically 
evolved cultural cluster. As such, the area has come into conflict with policies and 
planning objectives that have been undermining its economic, social, cultural and 
governmental sustainability (see Ch. 3.4). However, at the same time, planned cultural 
clusters have also been increasingly integrated into Hong Kong’s various approaches 
to urban redevelopment. The following section will therefore trace the articulation of 
these two domains.  
4.1.1 Urban Planning in Hong Kong 
 Hong Kong’s Town Planning Ordinance was enacted in 1939 and during its first 
years—in anticipation of a potential war—mainly concerned with hygiene and safety 
standards. However, a more comprehensive zoning of land as well as an overall urban 
renewal strategy were only introduced in the decade after 1945, for which the 
government commissioned British town planner Sir Patrick Abercrombie. Since 1984 
Hong Kong’s urban planning is framed by the Territorial Development Strategy (TDS) 
“to guide future development and provision of strategic infrastructure, and to help 
implement government policy targets in a spatial form” (Development Bureau, 2007: 
1). During the following years, the TDS had been updated twice (1986 and 1988), 
before it was eventually fully reviewed in 1998 after an eight-year consultation process. 
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The most recent—and still valid—TDS was published by the Development Bureau in 
2007, titled Hong Kong 2030: Planning Vision and Strategy. It covers the overall 
planning vision, the planning choices and the planning strategy for the next 20 years 
(Development Bureau, 2007). By providing the visionary planning framework for the 
whole territory, the TDS is also the broad guideline for sub-regional development 
strategies as well as urban renewal projects on district-level.  
 This administrative domain of urban planning is also subjected to a statutory 
system. As briefly discussed in the previous chapter (Ch. 3.2), the Town Planning 
Board (TPB) is responsible for the overall categorization of land use by drafting, 
gazetting and approving Outline Zoning Plans (OZP) in accordance with the Town 
Planning Ordinance (see also Chapter 3.2.3). An OZP usually consists of the zoning 
plan for a specific geographic area (currently the territory is divided into 140 OZPs) 
and accompanying notes that define all permitted land uses (Civic Exchange, 2006). 
Any amendments of the OZP through the TPB must be preceded by a planning study 
and the publication of a draft plan, to which eventually “any member of the public, 
whether or not he is the lessee, has a right to object” (Lai, 1997: 26).  
 Arguably, the emergence of culture as an urban planning concern is closely linked 
to the changes of Hong Kong’s TDS in reaction to new economic, social and political 
challenges. The TDS Review, published in early 1998, set out that the “Metro Area” 
should become a center for cultural functions for which the provision and promotion 
of new tourist attractions will be essential (Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau, 
1998a; 1998b). The plan for the WKCD, which was announced just a few months later, 
can be seen as a first direct response to these strategic objectives. In fact, the decision 
for using the newly reclaimed land in Victoria Harbour for a cultural quarter was based 
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on a previous survey, which stated that “1.3 million tourists … were interested in 
cultural, entertainment and major events, and believed that Hong Kong should enhance 
the promotion of these activities among tourists” (Housing, Planning and Lands 
Bureau 2005; Lee et al., 2013). Serving both Hong Kong’s symbolic economy and 
property market, the WKCD was initially supervised by the Development Bureau, but 
the commercial direction of drafted plans soon “activated” a civil society within Hong 
Kong’s cultural sector. After strong resistance against a potential “single-package” 
privatization, the planning of the WKCD was restarted in 2006 (Lee et al., 2013: 56). 
At first, the Development Bureau insisted on remaining the sole party responsible for 
the project, as another statutory body “would only create an unnecessary overlap” 
(Development Bureau, 2005). However, on-going doubt that the bureau could 
adequately address the expectations of a “world-class” cultural quarter led to the 
establishment of the West Kowloon Cultural District Authority (WKCDA) in 2008, 
putting the entire project under guidance of international arts administrators.  
 This controversial debate around the WKCD also coincided with the emergence 
of the city’s first comprehensive cultural policy strategy. In the early years of 2000 the 
government established the Culture and Heritage Commission (CHC) to formulate 
policy recommendations, of which 90% were eventually adopted by the Home Affairs 
Bureau (HKSAR, 2004). Since then, Hong Kong’s cultural policy is guided by five 
basic principles: “people-oriented”, “diversity/pluralism”, “holistic approach”, 
“freedom of expression” and “partnership” (CHC, 2003).83  
                                                 
83 The aspect of “community-driven”, which was put forward by the CHC as a sixth principle, was not adopted 
for the policy framework. 
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 Following the financial crisis, Hong Kong has also become increasingly receptive 
for ideas that could improve its international competitiveness and image as a global 
city (Cartier, 2008; Chu, 2012). While the branding campaign for “Asia’s World City” 
started in 2001, new mainstream concepts of creative city (2001), creative industries 
(2003) and creative class (2004) had a traceable impact on local policy debates (CHC, 
2003; Hui, 2003; HAB, 2004). The Hong Kong 2030 strategy was clearly informed by 
these aspects, integrating for the very first time “culture and arts development” into an 
overall planning vision and acknowledging its positive effects on living environment 
(“aesthetics”, “street arts”, “vibrancy”), tourism (“heritage”, “world-class”) and 
economy (“cultural and creative industries”) (Development Bureau, 2007). However, 
by offering only a visionary guideline, the TDS still left enough room for independent 
planning decisions, such as the choice between decentralization and consolidation. 
With fewer land available for so called new town projects and a decrease of land 
reclamation, urban renewal—used as an umbrella term for redevelopment, 
rehabilitation and revitalization (see Ch. 3.2.4)—has become one of the core strategies 
for Hong Kong’s Development Bureau. The following section will therefore analyze 
how this approach has affected the emergence, nature and organization of planned 
cultural clusters.   
4.1.2 Cultural Clusters 
 Arguably, for a long time clustering of various professional guilds (including 
artisans) has been an integral part of Hong Kong’s urban life.84 Cultural clusters in the 
                                                 
84 e.g.: second hand electronics in Sham Shui Po, printing industry in Lee Tung Street, red light districts in Wan 
Chai and Portland Street, kitchen utensils in Yau Ma Tei, dried seafood in Sheung Wan, electronic goods and 
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sense of modern discourses, however, have just been gradually introduced, starting 
with the provision of multi-functional public facilities such as the City Hall in Central 
in 1962. The Hong Kong Cultural Centre85—together with its nearby museums—
formed a second cultural focal point by providing a mix of entertainment, education, 
high arts and open space on the Kowloon side.86 However, since the announcement of 
the WKCD, culture has been increasingly instrumentalized for development projects. 
Table 5 (p. 101) offers a selective overview of the city’s planned cultural clusters since 
1998 in reversed chronological order. Based on this selection, this thesis suggests three 
prevailing models of clusters that differ in planning, funding and operation:  
 Artist villages (primarily production-oriented; initiated and managed by 
government, NGO or private company; examples: Cattle Depot Artist 
Village, Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre, ADC Arts Space) 
 Creative industry clusters (primarily mixed-use; initiated and managed 
by government or NGO; examples Police Married Quarters, Central 
Police Station, Comix Home Base) 
 Cultural quarters (primarily consumption-oriented; initiated and 
managed by government; example: West Kowloon Cultural District, City 
Hall and Tsim Sha Tsui waterfront) 
   
                                                 
sneakers in Mong Kok etc.  
85 In terms of its architecture, Abbas (1997: 66) criticized the Hong Kong Cultural Centre for its “modernist 
placeless structure” and “neglect of the local”. 
86 The City Hall, the Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts and the Hong Kong Arts Centre formed another 
cultural agglomeration across the harbor in Central and Wan Chai. Although all these venues are now among the 
oldest and most established ones, they were realized outside (or on top) of existing urban areas: the three 
locations on Hong Kong Island were built on newly reclaimed land, while the Tsim Sha Tsui cluster replaced the 
former railway terminus after its relocation to Hung Hom. 
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Table 5: Overview of planned cultural clusters in Hong Kong (own table) 
Project Mode / Year  Operation Financier 
ADC Arts Space  
 
Factory building  
“artist village”: subsidized 
private arts spaces in Wong 
Chuk Hang 
 
announced 2013 by Chief 
Executive, opened 2014 
Hip Shing Hong Group 
(owner/operator) in 
cooperation with ADC 
HKSAR (HK$ 8 
million, through 
ADC)  
Comix Home 
Base  
 
Heritage site 
“creative industry cluster”: 
self-funded NGO-led project, 
temporary tenancy agreement 
with operator (cultural use not 
pre-determined)  
 
announced 2011 by URA, 
opened 2013 
HK Arts Centre URA (HK$ 200 
million), 
infrastructure  
Police Married 
Quarters  
(PMQ) 
 
Heritage site 
“creative industry cluster”: 
self-funded NGO-led project, 
temporary tenancy agreement 
with operator (creative 
industry use pre-determined) 
 
announced 2009 by Chief 
Executive, completed 2014 
Musketeers Education & 
Culture Charitable 
Foundation (supported 
by HK Design Centre, 
Polytechnic University, 
and HK Design Institute 
of the Vocational 
Training Council) 
HKSAR 
(HK$ 560.1 
million), 
infrastructure; 
Musketeers 
Foundation 
(HK$ 110 
million), operation 
Central Police 
Station  
(CPS) 
 
Heritage site 
“creative industry cluster”: 
self-funded NGO-initiated 
project in partnership with 
government (land remains 
government-owned; cultural 
use not pre-determined) 
 
announced 2007 by Chief 
Executive, intended 
completion in 2015   
(Selection under 
progress) 
HK Jockey Club 
Charities Trust 
(HK$ 1.8 billion); 
infrastructure  
Jockey Club 
Creative Arts 
Centre 
(JCCAC)  
 
Factory building 
and heritage site 
“artist village”: self-funded 
NGO-initiated project, 
temporary tenancy agreement 
with operator  
 
announced 2005 by Chief 
Executive, completed 2008 
HK Creative Arts Centre 
Ltd. (subsidiary of 
Baptist University; 
supported by ADC and 
HK Arts Centre) 
HK Jockey Club 
Charities Trust 
(HK$ 69.4 
million), 
infrastructure  
Cattle Depot 
Artist Village 
(CDAV) 
 
Heritage site 
“artist village”: Government-
initiated and public funded 
project in response to Oil 
Street artist movement 
 
announced in 2000, completed 
in 2001 
Development Bureau 
(before Government 
Property Agency under 
the Financial Services 
and the Treasury Bureau) 
HKSAR (HK$ 23 
million), 
infrastructure 
West Kowloon 
Cultural District 
(WKCD) 
 
New site 
“cultural quarter”: 
Government-initiated and 
public-funded project; 
 
announced 1998 by Chief 
Executive, intended 
completion of 1st phase in 2015 
West Kowloon Cultural 
District Authority 
(statutory body)   
HKSAR 
(HK$ 21.6 
billion), 
infrastructure  
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Given the nature of organic clusters that are especially focused on cultural production 
(and based on this also serve a marginal consumer culture), the following analysis will 
focus on two of these three models: artist villages and creative industry clusters.87 As 
some of the projects are currently still under construction, the examples will be further 
narrowed down to four cases that have already been realized (at the day of writing) 
and therefore offer concrete evidence instead of mere assumptions. These are Cattle 
Depot Artist Village (CDAV), Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre (JCCAC), Police 
Married Quarters (PMQ) and Comix Home Base.    
 
Artist villages 
 The Cattle Depot Artist Village (CDAV) was Hong Kong’s first officially 
sanctioned cultural cluster. In 2001, the government turned the former slaughterhouse 
in Ma Tau Kok into a temporary arts space and provided subsidized studios to artists 
who had been formerly involved in the Oil Street movement (Cartier, 2008). Initially 
managed by the Government Property Agency (under the Financial Services and the 
Treasury Bureau), the premise was transferred to the Development Bureau in 2011.88 
For several years, the CDAV has been regarded as an improper cluster by both artists 
and media, leading to a lower occupancy rate (SCMP, 2007; SCMP, 2009). The critique 
mainly referred to two shortcomings: First, the management restrained the 
accessibility for the public, hampering the interaction with a broader community. 
                                                 
87 While there also have been successful private endeavors (e.g. Foo Tak Building in Wan Chai), this macro-
analysis is limited to officially planned clusters that directly relate to Hong Kong’s cultural policy and hence 
provide the necessary counterpart for the following discussion of spatial power.    
88 Arguably, the time of its establishment also coincided with the growing awareness for Beijing’s 798 Art 
District. Given their pioneering nature, both CDAV and 798 remain showcases for cultural clusters in their 
respective cities. 
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Second, the property is a Grade II historic building and so alterations of the space are 
generally prohibited.89 In 2008, the Arts Development Council published a study on 
potential measurements to improve the spatial conditions, funding, and management 
system (ADC, 2008), however with limited impact.90 According to the current OZP, 
the Cattle Depot is still reserved for “Government, Institution or Community Use” and 
“Open Space”, but a potential rezoning into a business zone (“OU(B)”) to facilitate 
synergies with the nearby Kai Tak Development is under consideration (TPB, 2013).  
 While the CADV remains an entirely government-led project until today, NGOs 
such as the Jockey Club Charities Trust (JCCT) have been taken on a crucial role for 
Hong Kong’s arts development for several decades.91 In cooperation with the ADC 
and the Hong Kong Arts Centre, the trust also funded the establishment of the Jockey 
Club Creative Arts Centre (JCCAC), which was completed in 2008 and has become a 
prime example for the cultural appropriation of industrial buildings. Although not 
representing a project that was initiated by the government, it was welcomed for taking 
over responsibility for a factory estate in Shek Kip Mei. In contrast to regular industrial 
buildings in Hong Kong, factory estates used to be public owned premises that were 
built by the Housing Authority as part of resettlement efforts in the 1970s. During the 
last 10 years, most of these estates have been closed and subsequently demolished. 
The Shek Kip Mei Factory Estate was vacated in 2001 and remained empty for several 
                                                 
89 In a recent article, HK Magazine categorized CDAV as a failure for heritage preservation in Hong Kong. See: 
http://hk-magazine.com/city-living/article/heritage-done-right 
90 In 2008, the Development Bureau commissioned the Arts Development Council for a research paper on the 
future of the CDAV that compared the feasibility of different organization models, drawing from international 
references and the accumulated experience from other local cultural clusters.  
91 The JCCT, for instance, financed the renovation of the Hong Kong Arts Centre and the construction of the 
Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts. The trust has also been a continuous sponsor of the Hong Kong Arts 
Festival.  
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years, causing recurrent costs of almost HK$ 350,000 per year. It was eventually the 
proposal and investment provided by JCCT that avoided the likely demolition of the 
building. In 2007, the TDS described JCCAC as “an important milestone towards 
innovative reuse of obsolete industrial buildings.” (Development Bureau, 2007) 
However, given the on-going disappearance of a great number of factory estates in 
recent years, it is unlikely that JCCAC becomes an adoptable model for similar 
premises. In total, HK$ 69.4 million were invested for converting the building into an 
arts center that currently accommodates 124 studios for discounted rental prices. While 
the management of JCCAC has been outsourced to a subsidiary of Hong Kong Baptist 
University on a temporary tenancy-agreement, the government keeps the ownership of 
the building and therefore full control over the land. According to the OZP, the JCCAC 
is the only cultural cluster in Hong Kong that is located within a designated residential 
zone (see Table 6 below for a comparison of OZP details).  
  Table 6: Statutory Outline Zoning Plan of current cultural clusters (own table) 
Cultural Cluster  OZP Zoning Reference 
West Kowloon Cultural 
District 
West Kowloon Cultural District Development 
Plan 
S/K20/29 (2013) 
Jockey Club Creative 
Arts Centre (Shek Kip 
Mei) 
Residential (Group A) S/K4/27 (2012) 
Cattle Depot Artist 
Village 
(Ma Tau Kok) 
Government, Institution or Community; Open 
Space 
S/K10/20 (2008) 
Central Police Station  
(Central) 
Other Specified Uses: “Historical Site Preserved 
for Cultural, Recreational and Commercial 
Uses” 
S/H3/29 (2013) 
Police Married Quarters  
(Sheung Wan)  
Other Specified Uses: “Heritage Site for 
Creative Industries and Related Uses” 
S/H3/29 (2013) 
Comix Home Base 
(Wan Chai) 
Urban Renewal Authority Development Scheme 
Plan Area 
S/H5/27 (2012) 
ADC Arts Space 
(Wong Chuk Hang) 
Other Specified Uses: “Business”  S/H15/29 (2014) 
Industrial Area 
(Kwun Tong) 
Other Specified Uses: “Business” S/K14S/18 (2013) 
Industrial Area 
(Fo Tan) 
Industrial  S/ST/29 (2013) 
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Creative Industry Clusters  
 While clusters such as CDAV and JCCAC can be understood as the first 
experiments for local artist villages on the Kowloon side (ADC, 2009), the recent 
transformation of historic sites—such as the Police Married Quarters (PMQ) and the 
Comix Home Base (Green House)—was mainly driven by a convergence of growing 
concerns for heritage preservation and creative industries.92 In 2009 the government 
inaugurated the CreateHK office and at the same time then Chief Executive Donald 
Tsang announced the “Conserving Central” campaign that should coordinate the 
redevelopment of valuable heritage sites on Hong Kong Island (Tsang, 2009).  
 After the PMQ had been declared a Grade III historical building in 2010, the 
government also approved a proposal from a private foundation to turn the quarters 
into a creative industry cluster that is specialized in design. Similar to the model of the 
JCCAC, the foundation has been given a temporary tenancy agreement to manage the 
premise after the government had provided an initial investment of HK$ 500 million 
for the conversion of the site. Although the PMQ is generally regarded as a non-profit 
operation, it is expected that it will be self-sufficient in the future. In addition, every 
five years a profit share of 50% will be handed to the government. Before the opening 
of the PMQ in April 2014, the OZP was rezoned to “other specified uses” annotated 
“heritage site for creative industries and related uses”.93 The zoning allows a mix of 
production (“studios”, “office”), entertainment (“eating places”, “shops”) and 
                                                 
92 Another example is the future Central Police Station (CPS) on Hollywood Road that will be developed into a 
mixed-use cultural and creative industry cluster during the following years. The project was initiated and funded 
by the JCCT.  
93 At the same time the OZP of the Central Police Station was adjusted to “other specified uses” annotated 
“historical site preserved for cultural, recreational and commercial uses”.   
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education (“training centers”, “schools”).94 
 A second example for a creative industry cluster model is the Comix Home Base, 
which opened in 2013 under the management of the Hong Kong Arts Centre. It is 
dedicated to the local cartoon industry and includes an exhibition area, a small studio 
for artists-in-residence and a library. Located in the former Green House in 
Murray/Burrows Street (Wan Chai), the Grade II heritage site remains under the 
responsibility of the statutory Urban Renewal Authority (URA) that has overseen its 
redevelopment. Following requirements for public accessibility, the URA decided to 
lease the upper floors to the Hong Kong Arts Centre for five years, while reserving the 
courtyard and frontage for public and commercial use. According to the OZP the 
building is currently located in a special development area without use restrictions.  
 In summary, the establishment of Hong Kong’s planned cultural clusters has often 
followed a similar procedure: First—as laid out in Table 5 (p. 101)—the new cluster 
is presented by the Chief Executive as part of an overall strategy (e.g. integrated in the 
policy address), after which its management is outsourced to a NGO. At the same time, 
the government remains the proprietor of the building and can therefore offer 
beneficial conditions to the management company, which operates the cluster under a 
temporary leasing agreement, varying between 5 years (Comix Home Base), 7 years 
(JCCAC) or 10 years (PMQ)95. Generally, the cluster is expected to be a self-financed, 
self-sustained and in some cases also profitable operation.96 Depending on its location, 
                                                 
94 Uses for hotels and offices are not prohibited, but need prior permission from the Town Planning Board. 
95 Comix Home Base: Hong Kong Arts Centre; PMQ: Musketeers Foundation; JCCAC: Hong Kong Baptist 
University 
96 For the PMQ the government receives 50% of the operational surplus every five years (the other 50% and the 
surplus during other years will be reinvested in the quarters).   
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the Town Planning Board might adjust the zoning plan to accommodate newly agreed 
uses and exclude others that seem detrimental to the intended nature of the project.97 
4.2 Cultural Policy in Hong Kong’s Urban Redevelopment? 
 In its latest territorial strategy, the Development Bureau acknowledged the need 
for “very different accommodation requirements and infrastructure support” in the 
cultural sector, as artists “tend to scatter among other land uses, e.g. 
commercial/residential areas or industrial districts” (Development Bureau, 2007: 66). 
The ADC (2010) report on industrial buildings proved this assumption right and the 
need for “creative space” was officially recognized in the 2013 policy address (Ch. 
1.1). However, as the case study has shown, the accommodation of such needs is often 
detrimental to the dominant objectives of current urban redevelopment projects and 
hence the “freedom of choice” for both real estate developers and cultural users (Ch. 
3.2.4). By juxtaposing aforementioned artist villages and creative industry clusters 
with the naturally evolved cluster in Kwun Tong, this section aims to foreground how 
spatial power has been established and subsequently challenged. After investigating 
how aspects of planning and ownership have shaped the fundamental conditions for 
cultural clusters, the research will then draw upon de Certeau’s dual concept of 
space/place (and tactics/strategies) to analyze Hong Kong’s overall cultural policy 
approach.   
                                                 
97 In comparison, the management company of Hong Kong’s Cyberport, which was established as a cluster for 
information and communications technology during the early 2000s, is fully owned by the HKSAR government. 
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4.2.1  Establishing Spatial Power 
 By defining the physical environment and its intended use, both the administrative 
(strategies) and statutory (zoning plans) planning systems have had a significant 
impact on spatial practices and cultural clusters in the city. However, at the same time, 
they cannot enforce how users will eventually perceive, conceive and represent the 
space. Therefore, the degree to which internal practices eventually cohere with 
external plans, can be an important indicator for the distribution of spatial power. 
Cultural spaces such as Hidden Agenda are generally rendered illegal by OZPs that do 
not permit the use for artistic and public entertainment purposes. Prior to the 
redevelopment of Kwun Tong, several livehouse venues emerged in industrial areas, 
but disappeared again after a short while. 98  Any changes in zoning plans had a 
marginal impact on industrial areas and most practices could continue as before, 
mainly—as argued earlier—due to specific governmental conditions (see Ch. 3.3.4). 
 For official artist villages such as CDAV and JCCAC, planning visions and 
strategies were also not the decisive factors for establishment. While the Cattle Depot 
was rather spontaneously “exchanged” for an occupied premise in Oil Street, JCCAC 
was initiated by a NGO that took over a redundant government-owned factory estate. 
Although both of these places set a precedence for the cultural use of industrial 
buildings and abandoned heritage sites, their model of arts clusters has since then not 
been adopted for similar spatial resources (e.g. Cheung Sha Wan Abbatoir, Kwun Tong 
Factory Estate). Nevertheless, since then culture has been increasingly incorporated 
                                                 
98 e.g. IMNet (2004-2009); N.Set Music (2008) 
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into Hong Kong’s overall planning vision, leading to a greater recognition of arts and 
creative industries for future development strategies.  
 Besides planning, spatial power is also established through ownership and its 
related rights and obligations.99 In contrast to Fo Tan, where some artists acquired 
entire factory units, most of the studios in Kwun Tong are only rented on short-term 
leases. Therefore, even a space such as Hidden Agenda does not operate outside the 
“politics of free-market economy” (Ng, 2009). Contrarily, the scattered ownership of 
industrial buildings, the fierce competition among landlords and the overall abundance 
of similar spatial resources have offered nurturing conditions for an organic cluster. 
However, the rapid valorization of property in recent years has changed the situation. 
Although many landlords are still willing to rent out their space for cultural use, they 
might be dispossessed or barred from reselling their property if they do not comply 
with the land use stipulated in the leasing agreement. Therefore, even independent 
cultural spaces increasingly rely on the sympathy of their landlords and how they 
handle pressure from different authorities (Interview: Chow, 2013). 
 In comparison, most premises that accommodate Hong Kong’s planned cultural 
clusters have remained under direct public ownership. While this entails a certain 
degree of stability and long-term perspective for users, the temporary transfer of 
management responsibilities to NGOs (JCCAC, PMQ, Comix Home Base) also passed 
“the economic burden of restoration, maintenance and development from the 
                                                 
99 While the government is the sole proprietor of all land, it can transfer its using rights for a limited time (most 
commonly 50, 75 or 90 years) through a leasehold system. During this period the lessee is fully responsible for 
the maintenance and compliance of all premises within the contracted area and liable to a yearly rent (3% of the 
ratable property value). The government, on the other hand, is entitled to dissolve any leasing agreement if the 
land is misused or payments are not received. As the land leasehold system generates a significant part of the 
income for Hong Kong’s revenue account, a steady increase of land value is in the government’s budgetary 
interest (See: http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2007/ppt/ps_02/plenary02_03_tse_ppt_2261.pdf).  
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government to the private sector” (Ku, 2010: 384). Planned cultural clusters are usually 
operated under a certain mission statement to define expected users, who are then 
selected through a tenancy application assessment. Effectively, artists and creative 
workers need to prove that they are eligible for occupying subsidized space and 
receiving the related economic, social and cultural benefits. Individual leases are 
usually limited to one or two years, after which the tenancy will be reviewed.  
4.2.2  Struggle over Spatial Power  
 As laid out in Chapter 2.3, Bennett argues that oppositional resistance is 
inadequate for an effective agency within the domain of cultural policy and therefore 
less productive than the Foucauldian understanding of “governmental power”. 
However, the relevance of spatial power in the case of Kwun Tong might suggest 
otherwise. Despite its cultural policy approach, this research argues that de Certeau’s 
conceptual differentiation between place and space (as well as strategies and tactics) 
offers a useful framework to analyze the impact of spatial power on cultural spaces, 
cultural clusters and—eventually—cultural policy in Hong Kong.  
 As the detailed analysis of the case study has shown, Hidden Agenda depended 
less on the materiality of a certain place than on the various conditions that have 
produced its space (as a practiced place) in Kwun Tong. Over the last five years, the 
livehouse has changed its location three times. While the lack of stability has deprived 
Hidden Agenda from the possibility of making strategic decisions—such as investing 
into better hardware or meeting conditions to obtain a proper license100— it also 
                                                 
100 Given the land use regulations for industrial buildings, an application for a temporary license for a “public 
place of entertainment” requires a costly waiver fee, which does not guarantee the final approval.  
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enabled the livehouse to adjust to the changing conditions and claim its space within 
the industrial area. Similar to the guerilla gigs, which artists in Kwun Tong have 
organized since 2005 (see Ch. 3.2.4), Hidden Agenda was able to challenge the spatial 
power that has been framed by urban planning and land ownership. The distinct 
governmentality of industrial space (Ch. 3.3.4) further increased the opportunities for 
tactical maneuvers (Ch. 3.2.3).  
 However, the redevelopment of Kwun Tong changed the existing power relations 
drastically. The rapid valorization of land turned industrial buildings into strategic 
investment objects, which—as such—are less accommodating for cultural spaces. At 
the same time, the EKEO used its own strategies for public space and converted the 
flyover into a symbolic place for Kwun Tong’s creative potential. However, its 
panoptic characteristics failed to represent the introverted industrial spaces for cultural 
production that have been produced outside (and in absence of) this form of spatial 
power. Eventually, when compared with Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, Kwun Tong 
did not provide the material preconditions that could have facilitated the cultural 
appropriation of a government-owned premise. In contrast to its equivalent in Shek 
Kip Mei (now the JCCAC), the Kwun Tong Factory Estate, built in 1966 with 817 
units, was demolished in 2008 “due to its obsolete design and deteriorating 
condition”.101  
    As discussed earlier, Hong Kong’s planned cultural clusters are generally located 
in premises under public ownership that have either been vacant or extensively 
                                                 
101 See: http://archive.news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/en/category/healthandcommunity/080912/html/080912en 
05002.htm. Since then the former lot in Hang Yip Street has remained vacant.  
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renovated before their cultural appropriation was decided. Compared to Kwun Tong, 
however, the cultural space has not emerged from existing spatial practices, but was 
entirely subordinated to the characteristics of the materiality of the place. The latter 
also dominates the branding and identity of the cluster: Cattle Depot Artist Village, 
Police Married Quarters, Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre and Comix Home Base 
have all become place-based representations for the arts and creative industries as 
means for heritage preservation. In contrast to Hidden Agenda that was produced by 
the tactics of its operators, the strategies of the proprietor have become the decisive 
elements for the cultural appropriation of the place.  
 Hence, when comparing the struggle over spatial power between planned and 
organically evolved clusters, it appears that cultural policy in Hong Kong follows a 
strictly place-based approach. Urban sites that are deemed suitable for cultural 
appropriation are primarily determined by their geographic location, their historic 
value, their zoning of land use, their current redundancy and their public ownership. 
However, while they offer a strategic and stable environment for cultural development, 
they also disregard the spatial practices that have shaped organically evolved clusters 
like Kwun Tong.   
 So far this chapter has mainly investigated the use of culture within Hong Kong’s 
dominant town planning strategies. However, while it is possible to draw significant 
conclusions from the struggle over spatial power, aforementioned creativity discourses 
have only played a minor role in this analysis. The following section will therefore 
discuss the relevance of these concepts for Hidden Agenda as well as the risks and 
opportunities that might emerge from them. 
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4.2.3   Creative Industries and Cultural Citizenship  
 Arguably, the justification for planned cultural clusters is based on two 
fundamental arguments (or assumptions): First, local artists and creative industries are 
unlikely to achieve similar outcomes if they are subjected to the free market economy. 
Second, culture can be considered as expedient for generating economic, urban and 
societal benefits. The cultural appropriation of industrial areas, on the other hand, has 
not operated in accordance with this logic. While many artists keep their studios 
intentionally private and do not feel obliged to engage with the public, the zoning laws 
have also suppressed the development of common spaces such as Hidden Agenda. 
 However, since the government targeted industrial buildings for revitalization, the 
question if and how to seek recognition from both authorities and the public—and 
hence establish an effective agency—has gained importance. In the case of Fo Tan, the 
annual open studio event became a crucial platform for claiming the significance of 
the cluster and its cultural production, backed by statistics of steadily growing visitor 
numbers:  
  “I would say we are using Fotanian as a brand to show 
the government that even though we organize it as artists, we 
are very systematic and also well-known overseas. 
        (Interview: Chow, 2013) 
 
After the foundation of a limited company that made the artists eligible for public 
funding, Fotanian received a grant from the Home Affairs Bureau (HAB) in 2012. 
However, it is unlikely that this strategy can be easily adopted for other organic clusters: 
  “Fo Tan and Kwun Tong need to be communicated 
differently to the government. We have to show how they 
[the government] ignore the arts scene in East Kowloon, 
while they create West Kowloon. And that they can’t 
organize shows with all these bands [in Kwun Tong], when 
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they actually try to knock their homes down.”  
       (Interview: Chow, 2013) 
 
In contrast to the visual arts cluster in Fo Tan, which has received direct support from 
the HAB in recognition of its symbolic and cultural value, the music cluster in Kwun 
Tong is far less conceivable for authorities, as shown in Ch. 3.2.4. Although generally 
affiliated with creative industries, there remains a certain misconception about the 
position of Hidden Agenda in this field, which has complicated the assignment of a 
clear label:  
  “[For the HAB] music is divided into two categories: 
the one that performs in City Hall and does not make any 
money needs support. The one that reaches out to young 
people, like Eason Chan, is commercial and therefore part of 
the creative industry.”    (Interview: EKEO, 2013) 
    
 While Hidden Agenda might qualify as a productive member of Hong Kong’s 
creative industries, such a recognition does not automatically lead to certain benefits. 
Currently, CreateHK endorses industries according to their economic potential and 
their contribution to economic growth, criteria that seem inapplicable for an 
underground venue.102 Although these factors might hamper a recognition within the 
official categories of arts and creative industries, one of Hidden Agenda’s identities is 
that of a livehouse and, as such, a space for consumption. Arguably, when cultural 
spaces are invested in the struggle of spatial power, the activation of cultural 
citizenship—in the sense of a fundamental right to consume—can become a decisive 
factor for their sustainability. Similar to Fo Tan, Kwun Tong has gained a certain 
                                                 
102 Another possibility for recognition within this sector is related to land use regulations. Recently, the 
Development Bureau introduced the category “creative industries” for some OZPs. While “venues for 
performances and theatrical entertainment” are included in this umbrella term, the definition has been only used 
for newly renovated heritage sites such as PMQ and Central Police Station. 
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degree of recognition through Hidden Agenda and its relevance for a broader 
community.  Nevertheless, if spaces such as Hidden Agenda remain excluded from the 
prevailing discourses of recognized arts and creative industries, the effectiveness of 
agency that derived from their governmental power will decrease if the distinct spatial 
practices of industrial areas continue to vanish. Therefore, the next section will use 
once more the case of Hidden Agenda to look at the organization of Hong Kong’s 
“culture portfolio” and to identify its current shortcomings.   
4.3 Culture Portfolio 
 For many artists in Hong Kong’s industrial areas, the lack of a cultural bureau is 
a significant factor for the general struggle over recognition and legality. While it is 
not expected that the establishment of such a bureau would immediately improve the 
status of organically evolved cultural clusters, it is the concentrated political 
responsibility and liability that would be seen as its most needed feature (Interview: 
Chow, 2013).  
 The term “culture portfolio” describes the placement of cultural affairs within the 
administrational framework of a government. Although the domain of “culture” can 
sometimes have its own ministry, it is also commonly paired with other related fields 
such as education, information, tourism, youth or economy (Lindsay, 2004: 66-67). In 
the context of South-East Asia, the emergence and formulation of cultural policies 
coincided with the establishment of post-colonial nation-states that understood culture 
as an integral part for building up their national prestige (Lindsay, 2004). However, as 
a special administrative region (and a former British colony), Hong Kong has not 
shared this responsibility for nationhood, which is also mirrored in the lack of foreign 
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affairs that are solely represented by China. While this particularity has certainly 
diminished the significance for—what Williams (1989) called—“cultural policy as 
display”, the government nevertheless dealt with “proper policies” (McGuigan, 2003) 
that have regulated, funded and utilized arts and culture in Hong Kong for at least 
several decades. The lack of a designated bureau for cultural affairs is also reflected 
in the rather functional than strategic arrangement of responsibilities that can be 
similarly related to Hong Kong’s place-based cultural policy approach, which was 
identified in the previous section.   
 Arguably, the current “culture portfolio” is mainly dominated by the Home Affairs 
Bureau, the Development Bureau and the Commerce and Economic Development 
Bureau. On an operational level, cultural policies are implemented by several statutory 
bodies—established under their respective ordinances (e.g. ADC, Hong Kong Arts 
Center, WKCDA etc.)—as well as various NGOs that often operate within “arm’s 
length”. At the same time, these institutions have taken up the role as intermediaries 
between government bureaus and artists.   
 However, in contrast to planned cultural clusters that operate under public 
ownership, non-compliant cultural spaces—while excluded from the place-based 
policy domain—have to face an even more complex portfolio. For instance, Hidden 
Agenda is subjected to policies and regulations of five different bureaus that vary in 
priorities, interpretations and agendas (see Table 7 on p. 117 for an overview). While 
this has hampered participatory planning processes and negotiations, it also created 
beneficial loopholes for non-compliant spaces whenever overlaps of responsibility 
occur between different government departments.   
 Currently, the revitalization of Kwun Tong is conducted under the supervision of 
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the EKEO, which is guided by the objective to establish a second Central Business 
District in 2020. However, the “soft” revitalization approach of the office has also 
facilitated direct dialogues between artists and government departments, without the 
usual mediation through statutory bodies or NGOs. While a general commitment from 
the Development Bureau to tolerate rehearsal studios in industrial buildings has not 
necessarily improved the prospects for cultural spaces, it nevertheless demonstrated 
that there has been both communication and negotiation across different bureaus and 
departments. At the same time, it revealed that neither the Home Affairs Bureau nor 
CreateHK consider the cause of an organically evolved cultural cluster in Kwun Tong 
within their interest and responsibility (see Ch. 3.2.4 and Ch. 4.2.3).  
  
 
Chief Executive
Food and Health 
Bureau
Food & Env. 
Hygiene Dept.
Liquor Licensing 
Board; Place of 
Public Enter-
tainment License
Environmental 
Protection Dept.
Noise Control 
Authority
Dept. of Health
Tobacco Control 
Office
Security Bureau
Fire Safety Dept.
Police Force
Home Affairs 
Bureau
Home Affairs 
Dept.
Licensing 
Authority
Leisure & Cultural 
Services Dept.
Arts Promotion 
Office
Development 
Bureau
Energizing Kowloon
East Office; 
Commissioner for 
Heritage's Office
Civil Engineering 
& Dev. Dept.
Lands Dept.
Planning Dept.
Town Planning 
Board
Commerce & 
Econ. Dev. Bureau
Communication & 
Tech. Branch
CreateHK Office
Commerce, Ind. & 
Tourism Branch
Tourism
Commission
Table 7: Organization chart of departments and authorities in the HKSAR that are   
practically engaged with issues of urban and cultural planning (own table) 
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Currently, the establishment of a cultural bureau remains an unlikely scenario for the 
near future, which leaves industrial areas primarily subjected to Hong Kong’s town 
planning strategies that have been determining the built environment, spatial practices 
and governmental conditions of organically evolved cultural clusters. Hence, 
temporary and project-based organizations such as the EKEO, which operate on 
bureau-level while being physically present in the concerned areas, would be most 
receptive for a stronger integration of—not merely place-based—cultural policy 
concerns into Hong Kong’s urban redevelopment.  
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5  CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES 
 Instead of establishing a mere critique on creativity and urban planning discourses, 
the methodological approach for this research was drawn from the field of cultural 
policy studies to aim for a pragmatic analysis of non-compliant spaces in Kwun Tong, 
while facilitating an articulation between concepts of space, urban planning, cultural 
clusters and governmentality. The final chapter will start with a brief summary that 
will also address the research questions as set out in the introduction (see Ch. 1.2). The 
following conclusion will be accompanied by an outline of further perspectives that 
have derived from this study.  
 Overall, the thesis was divided into a micro- and macro-perspective. First, the case 
study of Hidden Agenda was used as an entry-point to scrutinize the impact of urban 
redevelopment on Kwun Tong’s industrial area. In this context, the music venue 
presented a peculiar space that was able to transgress the passive nature of organically 
evolved clusters, which had emerged outside urban planning strategies and in 
contradiction to Hong Kong’s stringent land use regulations.  
 By using Lefebvre’s conceptual triad of perceived-conceived-lived space, the 
analysis started with a detailed account of the spatial practices that produced (and have 
been reproducing) non-compliant cultural spaces in Kwun Tong. It also laid out the 
various perceptions, symbols and representations that have been associated with and 
imposed on industrial areas by different interest groups.   
 In a sense, this introductory analysis has already touched upon the most significant 
aspects of this research by sketching the discrepancies between space, urban planning 
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and cultural policy. Moving away from Lefebvre’s abstract notion of space, the 
research then scrutinized Hidden Agenda in its practical form as a place of both 
(sub)cultural production and consumption. It laid out how the venue changed from a 
personal and private endeavor—that only relied on the patronage of one person—to an 
organized and well established livehouse that filled a void in Hong Kong’s local music 
scene, while negotiating between its various identities of being an illegal, subcultural 
and to some extent commercial space. Although Hidden Agenda had to operate within 
an “immovable paradox” to secure its independence and reproduction, it has still 
become a representational space for resistance against policies that have been 
challenging the cultural appropriation of industrial buildings. While being prosecuted 
for violating various regulations (mainly related to land use, liquor, public 
entertainment and fire safety), it made use of Kwun Tong’s governmental conditions 
to contest factual decisions by different authorities. Arguably, similar livehouse venues 
that are located in commercial or residential zones would not be able to operate 
illegally for such a long time. 
 Nevertheless, the redevelopment plans for Kwun Tong also led to an increasing 
politicization of the space. In order to understand the different discourses that emerged 
from this situation, this research looked at—“rather than through”—the Energizing 
Kowloon East Office. Adopting the so called place-making approach, the EKEO aims 
to facilitate an organic redevelopment process by attracting private developers and 
improving the built environment of public spaces. However, the integration of 
“creativity” into the conceptual master plan rather increased than eased the tensions 
with some local artists. Since then, the space underneath the flyover has become a 
controversial site for the aesthetic vision and gentrification of Kwun Tong’s industrial 
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area. At the same time, this attempted instrumentalization of culture also opened a 
room for maneuver, through which Hidden Agenda could tap into existing power-
relations. Although refusing any participation in the flyover project, affected groups 
could now directly address the Development Bureau through the EKEO. Nevertheless, 
there still remain major discursive differences regarding the utilization of space, the 
guiding values for development and the underlying principles of a free market 
economy.  
 Drawing upon these findings, the chapter eventually investigated Kwun Tong’s 
sustainability as an organically evolved cultural cluster in relation to its social, 
economic, cultural and governmental conditions. In particular, this research identified 
two dimensions of governmentality: First, non-compliant spaces such as Hidden 
Agenda have been shaped by a distinct set of spatial practices that have contested Hong 
Kong’s dominant spatial ideologies while creating a heterotopia for otherwise unviable 
activities. Second, using Bennett’s critique of de Certeau’s disempowered resistance, 
Hidden Agenda transcended oppositional resistance by (forcefully) engaging with 
different bureaus. In summary, this micro-perspective exposed both a conceptual and 
real detachment of the redevelopment process in Kwun Tong from Hong Kong’s 
cultural policy discourses at large, rendering concepts about creative city and creative 
industries practically irrelevant for a space such as Hidden Agenda that is mainly 
determined by the struggle over spatial power. 
 In order to investigate the actual relevance of these concepts, the perspective was 
raised to a macro-level in the second part of the thesis. By tracing the integration of 
culture and arts into the territorial planning strategy over the last 15 years, the research 
identified and analyzed different models for the establishment and operation of Hong 
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Kong’s most significant cultural clusters such as the Cattle Depot Artist Village, 
Jockey Club Creative Arts Centre, Police Married Quarters and Comix Home Base. 
Generally, most of the clusters have been outsourced to NGOs under short-term leasing 
agreements, while the government keeps the ownership of the premises. During recent 
years, such clusters were increasingly adopted by urban planning strategies, especially 
in relation to creative industries and heritage sites on Hong Kong Island. Subsequently, 
these planned clusters were compared with Hidden Agenda and Kwun Tong along the 
concept of spatial power. After giving a detailed account of how aspects of planning 
and ownership have set the framework for power relations, the research used de 
Certeau’s dual concept of space/place to contest Bennett’s disregard for resistance and 
underline the incompatibility between Hidden Agenda and Hong Kong’s place-based 
cultural policy approach.   
 Eventually, the research expanded its perspective to the organizational framework 
that currently defines and implements culture-related policies. The particular case of 
Hidden Agenda was used to problematize Hong Kong’s “culture portfolio” and to 
argue for a reassignment of responsibilities across different government sectors, 
especially by alleviating the significance of culture within the Development Bureau—
and hence within the domains of planning, zoning and land use.   
 
 Although this research has actually not identified a true ‘hidden agenda’ in Hong 
Kong’s cultural policy and urban redevelopment (as the title might have suggested), 
the peculiar relationship between these two domains remains complex and 
contradictory. Currently, the city’s cultural development is determined by—what I 
coined in this thesis—a place-based cultural policy approach. The nurturing of local 
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talents in the arts and creative industries highly depends on the vacancy of 
government-owned premises, the material justification for cultural appropriation and 
the zoning of land use. Once outside this place-based framework, cultural spaces and 
clusters are neither considered a policy responsibility nor an expedient resource for 
redevelopment. Industrial areas, however, have for long time provided these nurturing 
spatial, economic and governmental conditions that enabled artists to pursue their 
activities without any need for recognition or financial support. Meanwhile, some of 
these contingent clusters have turned into rooted landmarks of Hong Kong’s arts scene. 
At the same time, variations in urban and social fabric have facilitated the production 
of different art forms by drawing, for instance, visual artists to Fo Tan and musicians 
to Kwun Tong.   
 Following the Foucauldian approach in cultural policy studies, this thesis analyzed 
both the productive and destructive conditions for cultural production in industrial 
areas by showing how they informed (and subsequently changed) the organizational, 
operational and tactical nature of Hidden Agenda. However, while operating factually 
outside the domain of official cultural policy discourses, Bennett’s framework also too 
easily disembarked from the struggle over (spatial) power, as put forward by de 
Certeau. When accommodating the role of non-compliant spaces and organically 
evolved cultural clusters it is therefore necessary to recognize the usefulness of both 
governmentality and resistance as significant and relational concepts. This would also 
broaden the usability of cultural policy studies as an academic field of inquiry that 
utilizes both critical and pragmatic methods. 
  When comparing Hong Kong’s planned and organically evolved clusters, de 
Certeau’s concept of place and space is not only useful to establish the conceptual 
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differences, but also the contradictory similarities between these formations. Over the 
last five years Hidden Agenda has undergone a significant transformation, which has 
both undermined its informal character and strengthened its position within the cultural 
sector. No matter what, these contradictions will further increase: If there is the 
opportunity to continue as an unstable space in Kwun Tung, Hidden Agenda must 
continuously adjust its efficiency as a livehouse to sustain itself under ever changing 
conditions. Likewise, if Hidden Agenda would accept a place-based solution from the 
government—e.g. through the provision of a redundant public facility nearby—it will 
lose its relevance by sacrificing both its non-compliant and subcultural identity.   
 The case certainly exposed a profound detachment of Hong Kong’s invisible 
grassroots culture at the peripheries from cultural policy strategies at the centre that 
are mainly confined to fixed places in Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. This in itself 
is not a critique, because arguably industrial areas turned into productive clusters not 
only despite the lack of recognition, but also due to the distinct heterotopic and 
governmental conditions. However, given the current struggle over the sustainability 
of cultural spaces in the face of Kwun Tong’s imminent redevelopment, the question 
remains whether and to what extent such organic clusters should be of concern for 
cultural policy. At the same time, it remains unclear how cultural venues such as 
Hidden Agenda could be conceptually accommodated by the current creative industry 
discourse—given that their often unofficial and non-commercial status renders them 
insignificant for any relevant statistics of annual reports. Although theoretical concepts 
of creative cities actually regard alternative “street-level culture” as an important 
resource for urban development, there seems to be a missing link between the officially 
sanctioned creative industries and their alternative alterations. In the case of Kwun 
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Tong, it turned out that neither CreateHK nor the Home Affairs Bureau could provide 
any advice to the Development Bureau on how to deal with this non-place-based 
cultural cluster. Nevertheless, the practices and symbols associated with Hidden 
Agenda have become increasingly transferable across space. The livehouse has 
changed its location for three times over the last five years as a response to rising rents 
and legal prosecution, without diminishing its role for the local music sector.     
 By referring back to my somehow inquiring title: “Cultural Policy in Hong Kong’s 
Urban Redevelopment”, I would eventually say: The integration of culture into urban 
redevelopment processes—although fully recognized in planning visions—is not 
necessarily a concern of cultural policy. In fact, while the EKEO intends to use ‘culture’ 
and ‘creativity’ for its place-making approach, this does not entail a new approach in 
cultural policy towards arts spaces in industrial buildings. Nevertheless, under Hong 
Kong’s current government portfolio, spaces such as Hidden Agenda raise crucial 
questions for Hong Kong’s cultural development, but the current responses are only 
found within domains that are not conceived as cultural policy responsibilities in the 
first place. It is therefore necessary to establish research in cultural policy studies that 
also acknowledges a governmental, tactical and strategic domain that is practically 
detached from mainstream concepts such as creative city, creative class and creative 
industries. 
  
 While this research used the case of Hidden Agenda and Kwun Tong to discuss 
the current state of urban planning and cultural policy in Hong Kong, it has also arrived 
at two particular problems in the areas of creative industries (Ch. 4.2.3) and 
translocality (Ch. 3.1.3), which could not be adequately addressed within this master 
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thesis. Nevertheless, I hope to further investigate these issues in the future, as this 
thesis has provided a valuable foundation for the understanding of the relational 
aspects of space, urban planning and cultural policy. Certainly, these particularities are 
embedded in the historical, economic, cultural and social context of Hong Kong, but 
they are not necessarily unique to this place. 
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EPILOGUE 
“Queen’s Pier” by King Ly Chee (2008) 
 
This is all that’s left of my past 
Every time a building gets torn down 
My heart gets ripped apart 
When I walk down these streets, 
No long familiar to me 
The image in my head is now dead. 
 
Now that you’ve erased the identity 
What’s left of our history? 
No not another mall! 
Does the blood and sweat of our forefathers mean nothing? 
This time you’ve gone too far 
Their blood and sweat 
Created all of this 
Will be a memory 
We will never let forget 
 
In time we’ll live to regret 
The decisions that have been made 
In time we’ll be questioned 
Why we didn’t do something. 
 
With the sounds of destruction 
When the walls come crumbling down 
Our history will drown 
Ripped away from us forever 
How can we live with this shame 
That we didn’t protect her name. 
 
Stand up and protect our home 
Stand up and protect what’s ours 
Raise this issue in your home 
Raise this issue in your school 
Raise this issue with everyone 
Just don’t let these walls fall 
 
Robbed me of my memories 
Taken away from me 
Stolen my history 
Tell me what’s left for me 
 
Time to take back what’s been lost 
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APPENDIX 
List of Interviewees 
Chow, Chun Fai - visual artist, founder of Fotanian open studio event and founder of 
the Factory Artist Concern Group and Hong Kong Culture Monitor 
 
Farooqi, Riz - founder and singer of the Hong Kong hardcore band King Ly Chee 
(active since 1999) 
 
Ho, Winnie - deputy head of the Energizing Kowloon East Office (HKSAR 
Development Bureau) 
 
Representative of Strategic Sounds - a former livehouse in an industrial building in 
Kwun Tong 
 
Representative of Beating Heart - a former livehouse in an industrial building on Hong 
Kong Island 
 
Representatives of Musician AREA - a livehouse and music business in an industrial 
building (previously located in Kwai Fung, currently located in Kwun Tong) 
 
Representatives of Hidden Agenda - a livehouse in an industrial building in Kwun 
Tong  
 
Various musicians that live and rehearse in industrial buildings in Kwun Tong, Ngau 
Tau Kok and Tuen Mun 
 
 
 
 
The identity of some interviewees will be protected due to potential violations of 
current land using regulations.   
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